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I. INTRODUCTION
In the span of twenty-three years, sixty-eight percent of capital
judgments reviewed by the courts were overturned due to serious error, most
commonly because of grossly incompetent defense lawyering.' The error
rates in capital cases have reached epidemic proportions, "subjecting
innocent and other undeserving defendants-mainly, the poor . . . -to
execution." 2 Although high quality legal representation is crucial in capital
cases, the reality is that poor lawyering runs rampant, as almost all capital
cases are handled by court-appointed attorneys, who lack the time and
resources to fully devote themselves to the cases.'
The growing public sentiment is that "death sentences are doled out in
capital cases 'not for the worst crimes but for the worst lawyers.' 4 Yet our
courts have taken a passive stance on defense lawyering in capital cases,
giving broad deference to attorney decisions, and attributing errors and
omissions to sound trial strategy.5 This passivity allows questionable
attorney conduct to go undeterred, thus perpetuating poor quality legal
representation.6 Unfortunately, there are many examples of egregious
conduct that have been held by courts to be adequate, such as cases where
attorneys were intoxicated, abusing drugs, mentally ill, or sleeping during
the trial.7
1. James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital
Cases, 1973-1995 24 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper, Working Paper No. 15, 2000),
available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/press/reports/pdfs/Error-Rates-in-Capital-Cases-1973-
1995.pdf.
2. Id. at 22.
3. See John E. Sporer, III, Note, Scared to Death: The Separate Right to Counsel at Capital
Sentencing, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 505, 520 (1999) (quoting Stephen S. Bright, Counsel for the
Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835,
1865 (1994)).
4. Id. at 520.
5. See Jeffrey Levinson, Don't Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 147, 148-49 (2001).
6. Id. at 165.
7. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REv. 425, 455 (1996);
see Fowler v. Parratt, 682 F.2d 746, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (defendant's trial attorney was an alcoholic
and suffered blackouts while representing him, but the court refused to establish a rebuttable
presumption of ineffectiveness for an attorney who is an alcoholic, and found that the defendant
failed to show that he was prejudiced by any of his attorney's errors); People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d
419, 440-41 (Cal. 1989) (defendant's attorney was an alcoholic and was arrested for driving to the
courthouse under the influence of alcohol, but the court nevertheless rejected the claim that the
attorney was per se ineffective because of his alcoholism); State v. Coates, 786 P.2d 1182, 1187
(Mont. 1990) (the court found that under Strickland, the attorney's use of cocaine was irrelevant to a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872, 875-86 (9th Cir. 1987) (the
court refused to apply a per se ineffectiveness rule where defense counsel was mentally ill); United
States v. Petersen, 777 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1985) (defendant alleged that counsel fell asleep
during trial, but the court found that defendant failed to show prejudice under Strickland).
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The standard for deciding effective assistance was announced by the
Court in the 1984 case of Strickland v. Washington.8  In order to find
ineffective assistance under Strickland, the defendant must prove that
counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. 9 Strickland instructs the courts to measure counsel's
performance based on his perspective at the time and not in hindsight.1o As
a result, despite cases involving questionable representation, lawyers are
given the benefit of the doubt, and few convictions have been reversed.
However, in the past five years, the United States Supreme Court has made a
sudden shift in their approach to handling claims of ineffective assistance in
capital cases, and is now taking an active stance in monitoring attorney
performance.
Rompilla v. Beard1 is the latest case demonstrating the Court's desire to
remedy the errors in the capital system. The Court has recently held that the
execution of the mentally retarded and juveniles is unconstitutional, 12 and
Rompilla is the third major case in the past five years in which the Court has
overturned a death sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 13
Rompilla is unique because it is not a case in which defense counsel simply
failed to make attempts to provide a defense, but rather counsel was held
ineffective even though their performance was neither nonexistent nor
terrible. 
14
8. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
9. Id. at 687.
10. Id. at 689.
11. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
12. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the death penalty for the mentally
retarded is unconstitutional); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the death penalty
for juveniles is unconstitutional).
13. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (overturning a death sentence due to ineffective
assistance of counsel); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (overturning a death sentence due to
ineffective assistance of counsel); Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 374.
14. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 380-81. See Colin Garrett, Death Watch: Supreme Court Re-
Emphasizes Need For Thorough Penalty Investigation, 29 CHAMPION 52, 53 (2005). Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which he acknowledges that "[tihis is not a case in which
defense counsel simply ignored their obligation to find mitigating evidence, and their workload as
busy public defenders did not keep them from making a number of efforts", as counsel interviewed
Rompilla and several of his family members and arranged for three mental health experts to examine
reports of Rompilla's mental state. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381. During the sentencing phase, counsel
presented testimony of Rompilla's family members who testified on his behalf, claiming that he was
innocent and a good man. Id. Thus, this was not a case in which counsel entirely failed to
investigate and present mitigating evidence. Nevertheless, the Court found counsel's performance
inadequate because they failed to pursue a particular avenue of mitigating evidence; namely,
Rompilla's prior conviction file. Id. at 383.
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Ronald Rompilla was charged with the 1988 murder of James Scanlon,
a bar owner from Allentown, Pennsylvania. 5 The court appointed two
public defenders to represent him at trial.' 6 At the guilt phase, the jury
found Rompilla guilty on all counts, and during the sentencing phase, the
jury found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating evidence,
and sentenced him to death. 7 In preparing their mitigation case, defense
counsel interviewed Rompilla and five of his family members, and arranged
for three mental health experts to evaluate him.18 However, Rompilla was
uninterested in helping them develop a mitigation case, and his family
members suggested that no mitigation evidence was available.' 9 Rompilla,
however, sought post-conviction relief, raising a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, where it was then discovered that his trial lawyers had
failed to pursue numerous avenues in building their mitigation case, such as
examining his school, medical, court, and prison records. 20 Further, had
they reviewed the case file pertaining to his prior conviction, they would
have discovered mitigating evidence regarding Rompilla's traumatic
childhood, organic brain damage, mental retardation, mental health
impairments, and alcoholism.
21
Applying the Strickland standard, the Court held that defense counsel's
performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. Specifically, it held that counsel's failure to examine Rompilla's
prior conviction file constituted deficient performance, as counsel knew the
prosecution intended to use Rompilla's prior conviction to prove an
aggravating circumstance, yet they failed to examine the file, which
contained significant mitigation evidence that would likely have caused the
jury to reach a different result had it been presented to them.22 The Court
held that when both the capital defendant and his family members suggest
that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer must make reasonable
efforts to review material he knows the prosecution will likely rely on as
evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase.23
The purpose of this note is to analyze the Rompilla decision and discuss
its implications. Part II presents a brief history of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and the development of the right to effective assistance of
counsel in the context of capital cases. 24  Part III outlines the facts of
15. Id. at 377.
16. Id. at 378.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 381-82.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 382.
21. Id. at 390-91.
22. Id. at 393.
23. Id. at 377.
24. See infra notes 28-169.
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Rompilla.25 Part IV summarizes and evaluates the Court's majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions.2 6 Part V examines both the legal
significance and the societal impact of the Rompilla decision.27
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
This section will trace the evolution of the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel, and its application to capital cases. First, it
traces the history of the right to counsel, from its inception to its first
judiciary application, followed by an examination of how it came to be
interpreted over time by the Court. Next, this section examines the Court's
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as being the right to
effective assistance of counsel. The majority of the section is devoted to an
analysis and critique of the Supreme Court case of Strickland v. Washington,
which established a uniform standard for effective assistance of counsel.
Finally, this section examines the right to effective assistance of counsel in
the context of capital cases.
A. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to ... have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence [sic]. 28
Former U.S. Court of Appeals judge, David L. Bazelon, described "the
history of the application of the sixth amendment [right to counsel] ... [as]
one of tiny steps forward followed by long periods without any
movement. ' '29 He analogized this historical progression to plateaus, with the
steps forward being the slopes, and the motionless periods as plateaus.3 °
The history of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel begins with an
analysis of English common law. Originally, in England, a person who had
been charged with treason or a felony was denied the assistance of counsel,
whereas a party to a civil case or a person charged with a misdemeanor was
25. See infra notes 170- 98.
26. See infra notes 199-268.
27. See infra notes 269-309.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
29. Kelly Green, "There's Less in This Than Meets the Eye:" Why Wiggins Doesn't Fix
Strickland and What the Court Should Do Instead, 29 VT. L. REv. 647, 650 (2005) (citing David L.
Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811, 818-19 (1976)).
30. Id.
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entitled to the full assistance of counsel.3' In 1688 the rule was abolished as
to treason, but not for felonies. 32 Many English lawyers saw this rule as
outrageous, as a person was granted assistance in petty offenses but not in
cases where it was most needed.3  Proponents of the rule argued that in
many felony cases the court itself was counsel for the defendant.3a But
judges "cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, or
participate in those necessary conferences between counsel and accused.
35
Indeed, the common law rule prohibiting assistance of counsel to those
persons charged with a felony was rejected by the American colonies.36
The right to counsel first came about with the ratification of the Sixth
Amendment in 1791, which recognized a right to counsel in all criminal
prosecutions. 7 With the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment nearly 100
years later, Congress dictated that no State shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.",38 Thus, as it applies to the
Sixth Amendment, the' Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires states to "abide by all procedures essential to fundamental fairness
in assistance of counsel issues.
3 9
The right to counsel was not directly addressed by the judiciary until
1932, when the Supreme Court heard the case of Powell v. Alabama.4 ° In
Powell, the Supreme Court held that defendants have a right to retain
counsel, and that counsel must be appointed for indigent defendants in state
capital cases. 4' In Powell, the defendants pled not guilty to charges of
31. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932) (citing I Cooley's Const. Lim., 8th ed., 698, et
seq., and notes).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 61 (J. Sutherland arguing that a judge cannot act as counsel for the defendant).
36. Id. at 61-65. Prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution, almost all of the
colonies had rejected the English common law rule and recognized a right to counsel in all criminal
prosecutions, except for one or two colonies, in which the right was reserved for capital offenses or
more serious crimes. Id. at 64-65. The view of the colonists is illustrated by the remarks of
Zephaniah Swift, in his book, "Of Crimes and Punishments", printed in 1795:
We have never admitted that cruel and illiberal principle of the common law of England
that when a man is on trial for his life, he shall be refused counsel, and denied those
means of defence [sic], which are allowed, when the most trifling pittance of property is
in question. The flimsy pretence, that the court are to be counsel for the prisoner will
only heighten our indignation at the practice: for it is apparent ... that a court can never
fumish a person accused of a crime with the advice, and assistance necessary to make his
defence [sic].
Id. at 63 (citing ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
Windham by John Byrne, 1795-96, Vol. II, Bk. 5, "Of Crimes and Punishments," c. XXIV, "Of
Trials," pp.398-99).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
39. Green, supra note 29, at 653.
40. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
41. Id. at 71.
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rape4 2, and at their arraignment they were not asked whether they had or
were able to employ counsel, or wished to have counsel appointed.43
Rather, the judge simply appointed "'all the members of the bar"' to
represent the defendants at trial "'if no counsel appears." '44 But since the
judge never appointed a specific attorney to represent the defendants, they
had no counsel for consultation, investigation, or pre-trial preparation.45 In
fact, it was not until the morning of the trial that a lawyer was designated to
represent the defendants.46 The defendants were ultimately found guilty and
sentenced to death. 47  The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
convictions and death sentences, because it held that the denial of counsel
from the time of their arraignment until their trial was a violation of due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.48 Although the Court held that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a capital case is a fundamental
right, this case was analyzed and decided under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Court held that the lower
court's failure to give the defendants reasonable time and opportunity to find
counsel was a denial of due process. 49 The Court said that even if they had
had time to obtain counsel "the necessity of counsel was so vital and
imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment
of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
50
It was not until its 1963 decision in Gideon v. Wainwright5l that the
Supreme Court shifted the focus of the right to counsel analysis from the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Sixth Amendment. In Gideon, the Court held
that the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment is one of the
fundamental rights "made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
42. Id. at 49. The defendants in Powell were seven African-American boys who were charged
with raping two white girls. The defendants had been riding on a train through Alabama, which is
where the rape allegedly occurred. Id. at 50. Once off the train they were taken into custody and
arrested. Id. at 51.
43. They were all ignorant, illiterate, and from out of state. Id. at 52. They were not asked
whether they had counsel, were able to afford counsel, or wished to have counsel appointed. Id.
44. Id. at 53.
45. Id. at 57.
46. Id. at 56.
47. Id. at 50.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 71. The Court stated that notice and the opportunity to be heard constitute the main
elements of due process of law. Id. at 68. The opportunity to be heard includes the right to
assistance of counsel. Id. at 69. The Court found that "[t]he right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." Id. at 68-69.
50. Id. at 71.
51. 372 US 335 (1963).
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Amendment."52 Thus, all criminal defendants, whether in state or federal
court, have a right to be represented by counsel. 3 Further, the Court held
that courts must appoint counsel for an indigent defendant if he or she is
charged with a felony. 54  Although this rule does not apply to indigent
misdemeanants, the Supreme Court subsequently held in Argersinger v.
Hamlin55 that no imprisonment may be imposed for misdemeanors unless
the defendant is represented by counsel. 6
While these cases clearly established that the right to counsel is a
fundamental right, they did not define the exact nature of this constitutional
guarantee. In the next step of the development of the right to counsel, the
courts began to flesh out the nature of this right.
52. Id. at 342. Gideon involved an indigent defendant charged with breaking and entering,
which was a felony under state law. Id. at 336-37. However, the particular felony was not a capital
offense, and under then existing state law defendants were only entitled to appointment of counsel in
capital cases. Id. at 337. Accordingly, the defendant was forced to conduct his own defense, and
was ultimately found guilty. Id.
53. Gideon represents an expansion of Powell because it extended the right to counsel to all
criminal defendants, not just capital defendants. Further, in arriving at its decision in Powell that
courts must appoint counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases, the Court focused on the
unfortunate circumstances of the defendants, and their inability to make their own defense. Powell,
287 U.S. at 71. The facts indicated that the defendants were ignorant, illiterate, young, and far away
from their family and friends. Id. Thus, the Court felt that the appointment of counsel was a
necessity, stating that
in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable
adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness,
illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign
counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law...
Id.
However, in Gideon, the defendant was intelligent and competent, and conducted his own
defense as best as he could. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337. He made opening and closing statements,
cross-examined the state's witnesses, presented his own witnesses, and refused to testify. Id. Unlike
Powell, the Court did not focus on the circumstances or abilities of the defendant in making its
decision that the right to counsel is a fundamental right that must be provided to all criminal
defendants. Instead, it emphasized the importance of the professional training, knowledge, and
experience that attorneys provide, and stated that "[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman has
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law ...[h]e lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have [sic] a perfect one." Id. at 345 (quoting
Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69).
54. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. Specifically, the Court held that the right to counsel is a
fundamental right and an indigent defendant cannot be assured a fair trial without counsel. Id. The
Court recognized that since the government hires prosecutors, and almost all defendants charged
with crimes who can afford counsel hire the best attorneys to assist them, "lawyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries." Id. Thus, in order to ensure a fair process, indigent defendants must
have the assistance of counsel when facing their accusers. Id. However, the Court implicitly limited
the application of this rule to felonies. Id.
55. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
56. Id. at 40.
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B. The Sixth Amendment Guarantee of Effective Assistance of Counsel
1. Pre-Strickland Era
The notion that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to effective
assistance of counsel has its roots in the Powell decision."7 Seven years
later, in the case of McMann v. Richardson5 8 , the Supreme Court found that
"[i]t has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel."5 9 Thus, implicit in this language is a need
for minimum standards of an adequate defense. However, the Court failed
to define the concept of "effective assistance," so the lower courts were left
to establish their own standards. 60 Some of the lower courts turned to the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause for guidance. 6' The Court had
recently agreed with a holding that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause was only violated "'where the circumstances surrounding the trial
shocked the conscience of the court and made the proceedings a farce and a
mockery of justice.' ' ' 62 Thus, for those courts that adopted the "farce or
mockery of justice" test, counsel's performance would only be deemed
ineffective if it shocked the conscience of the court.63 Other courts turned to
the Sixth Amendment for guidance, and interpreted the right to counsel as
requiring counsel to provide reasonably effective assistance. 64 The
57. Powell, 287 U.S. at 56. Although the defendants in Powell did have counsel during the trial,
counsel was not appointed until the morning of the trial. Id. The Supreme Court held that the
presence of counsel during the trial was not enough, because the failure to make an effective
appointment of counsel amounted to "a denial of effective and substantial aid," which was a denial
of due process in and of itself. Id. at 53, 71. Although the attorneys made their best efforts to
represent the defendants at trial, the defendants were denied counsel from the time of their
arraignment until the start of their trial, which the Court identified as a critical period of the
proceedings, since "consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally
important." Id at 57.
58. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
59. Id. at 771 n.14.
60. Green, supra note 29, at 656.
61. Id. See also Kirchmeier, supra note 7, at 431-32. By 1970 all eleven circuits had turned to
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause for guidance as to the appropriate standard to measure
attorney performance. Id.
62. Green, supra note 29, at 656 (quoting Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945)).
63. Elizabeth Gable & Tyler Green, Current Developments 2003-2004: Wiggins v. Smith: The
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard Applied Twenty Years After Strickland, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICs 755, 757 (2004); see also Green, supra note 29, at 657. The "farce and mockery of justice"
test was particularly harsh on defendants claiming that counsel had been ineffective, as it was nearly
impossible to surmount. Green, supra note 29, at 657. For example, instances in which defense
attorneys had slept during the trial or complained to judges about having to be involved in the cases
were not found to be ineffective under this standard. Id.
64. Green, supra note 29, at 657-68.
1147
"reasonably effective assistance" standard required counsel to act with
diligence and competence in conformity with the prevailing standards of
professional conduct. 65  This standard was much friendlier to defendants,
and by 1983, all of the circuit courts had adopted this in favor of the "farce
and mockery" test.66  In addition to requiring proof that counsel had been
ineffective, some circuits introduced the "prejudice" component, which
required defendants to show that the ineffectiveness harmed them.67
However, this rule was not applied uniformly among the circuits, and there
was disagreement as to the weight and application of the rule.6 8
2. The Strickland Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In response to the lack of clarity as to the proper test for effective
assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court arrived at a standard for
determining ineffective assistance in the landmark case of Strickland v.
Washington.69 In a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, Strickland requires
the defendant to prove: 1) that counsel's performance was deficient, and 2)
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.7 °
65. Id. at 658.
66. Id. at 657-59. See also Kirchmeier, supra note 7, at 431-42. Courts began to abandon the
"farce and mockery" test after 1970. Id. at 431. In 1970, the Fifth Circuit "interpreted the right to
effective counsel to mean 'counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective
assistance."' Id. at 431-32. Then, the Third Circuit replaced the farce and mockery test with a
'normal competency"' standard. Id. at 432. Thereafter, the rest of the circuit courts began to adopt
the "reasonably competent assistance" standard, and by 1983 no circuit court used the farce and
mockery test. Id.
67. Green, supra note 29, at 659.
68. Id.
69. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the defendant was indicted for three brutal murders, in
which he repeatedly stabbed his victims. Id. at 672. The defendant waived his right to a jury trial
and pleaded guilty. Id. Before the trial, the defendant told the judge he had no prior criminal record
and was under extreme stress at the time of the crimes, but that he accepted responsibility. Id. In
preparation for the sentencing phase, counsel spoke with the defendant about his background, as well
as his wife and mother. Id. at 672-73. However, given the overwhelming evidence against the
defendant and the absence of mitigating circumstances, counsel decided not to present character
witnesses because he felt they could not overcome evidence of defendant's confessions. Id. at 673.
Further, he did not request a psychiatric examination because based on his conversations with the
defendant, there was no indication that he had psychological problems. Id. Counsel's strategy was
to convince the jury at the sentencing phase that defendant's life should be spared because he had
been under extreme stress at the time, and he accepted responsibility for his crimes. Id. The judge
found that the aggravating circumstances far outweighed any mitigating factors, and sentenced him
to death. Id. at 675.
The defendant then sought relief, claiming that counsel had provided ineffective assistance by
his failure to request a psychiatric report, investigate and present character witnesses, and make
meaningful arguments to the judge. Id. Ultimately, the Supreme Court denied his claim, and held
that counsel had been effective, because counsel's strategic decision not to seek more mitigation
evidence was based on reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 699. Further, the Court held that
there was no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the conclusion
that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors. Id. at 700.
70. Id. at 687.
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In a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court places the
burden on the defendant to prove that counsel's performance was deficient.71
This requires the defendant to specify the acts or omissions that are allegedly
deficient.72 Under the first prong of Strickland, counsel's performance will
only be "deficient" if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness,
thus not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys. 73 The
Court held that an attorney's performance should conform to prevailing
professional norms, which entail basic duties such as providing zealous
advocacy for the client's cause, and consulting with the defendant on
important decisions.74 Although the Court stated that the American Bar
Association standards and the like could be used as guides to determine
reasonable attorney conduct, it refused to impose specific guidelines or
requirements of effective assistance.75 Its reasoning was that the Sixth
Amendment merely refers to the right to counsel, and does not specify
certain requirements for effective assistance, so no specific guidelines are
needed. Further, the Court was concerned that a set of rules would fail to
take into account the wide range of scenarios attorneys face, and would
restrict their ability to make tactical decisions.77 Thus, the Court held that
the attorney's conduct must be analyzed in light of all of the circumstances
to determine whether it was reasonable. 8 In analyzing the attorney's
conduct, the Court mandated that courts should avoid hindsight, and
evaluate performance based on counsel's perspective at the time. 79 Courts
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonable
and effective, so the burden rests on the defendant to prove otherwise. 80
71. Id.
72. Id. at 690.
73. Id. at 687-88 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970)).
74. Id. at 688.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 689. The Court was particularly concerned that rigid requirements could impair the
independence of counsel, and discourage attorneys from accepting cases. Id. at 690. Further, the
Court feared that detailed guidelines might distract counsel, such that he or she would be spending
more time worrying about complying with all of the rules than advocating the client's cause. Id. at
689. The Court also pointed out that the aim of the Sixth Amendment "is not to improve the quality
of legal representation," but merely to ensure a fair procedure. Id. Thus, when courts are analyzing
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, they should focus primarily on whether or not the
procedure was fair and just.
78. Id. at 688.
79. Id at 689.
80. Id. This presumption exists in order to account for the broad range of styles and strategies
employed by attorneys. Id. The Court recognizes that not all attorneys will approach a case from
the same way, so there must be a strong presumption that counsel's actions and decisions were based
on sensible trial strategy. Id.
1149
Even if the defendant is able to prove that counsel's performance was
deficient, he must still prove prejudice in order to prevail on his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. 8 Under the second prong of Strickland, in
order to show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, the
defendant must prove that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different., 82  A reasonable probability is defined as that which is
"sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 83  There are certain
circumstances in which prejudice is presumed, so the second-prong of
Strickland is automatically satisfied. Prejudice is presumed where there is:
1) a complete denial of counsel during a critical stage of the trial, 2) a
complete failure to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial
testing, 3) a low probability that even a fully competent attorney could
provide effective assistance, and 4) an instance in which counsel "'actively
represented conflicting interests.' 84
3. Critique of Strickland
Strickland established a uniform standard for determining when
counsel's performance will be deemed constitutionally infirm. Although
Strickland resolved the confusion among the lower courts as to the proper
test for effective assistance of counsel, the decision has been wrought with
criticism. Critics argue that the test fails to provide a workable framework
by which to measure attorney performance and allows questionable legal
representation to go unchecked, as judges are afforded broad discretion in
reviewing ineffective assistance claims, which often leads to arbitrary
decisions. 85
81. Id. at 691-92.
82. Id. at 694.
83. Id. The Court stated that it would not be enough for the defendant to show that the deficient
performance had some possible effect on the outcome, because practically any error of counsel could
satisfy this test. Id. at 693. However, the defendant does not have to go so far as to prove that the
deficient performance more likely than not altered the outcome. Id.
84. Id. at 692.
85. See Green, supra note 29, at 648 ("Strickland's high deference to counsel's strategic choices
allows appellate courts to view egregious errors as trial tactics"); David D. Langfitt & Billy H.
Nolas, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 26 ABA LITIG. 6, 8 (2000) ("on
review, courts seem to search until they find a reasonable tactic somewhere in counsel's failure");
Richard L. Gabriel, The Strickland Standard For Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:
Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1259 (1986)
(arguing that reviewing courts quickly excuse counsel's errors by labeling acts or omissions as
tactical decisions); Amy R. Murphy, Further Developments on Previous Symposia: The
Constitutional Failure of the Strickland Standard in Capital Cases Under the Eighth Amendment, 63
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 180 (2000) ("Strickland has given appellate courts overly broad
discretion to determine exactly what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. As a result, there
is little consistency within judicial districts or across districts."); Donald J. Hall, Effectiveness of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 225 (2003-04) (arguing that Strickland permits
"'effective but fatal"' counsel); Levinson, supra note 5, at 147; Gable & Green, supra note 63, at 764
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In establishing the standard for effective assistance of counsel, the
Strickland Court asserted that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment is "not to
improve the quality of legal representation" but merely "to ensure that
criminal defendants receive a fair trial."86 Indeed, one of the critiques of the
Strickland standard is that it allows grossly incompetent attorney conduct to
go undeterred, thus perpetuating poor quality legal representation.87  In his
dissenting opinion in Strickland, Justice Marshall cautioned that the first
prong is "so malleable that, in practice, it will either have no grip at all or
will yield excessive variation in the manner in which the Sixth Amendment
is interpreted and applied by different courts." 88  In his view, the
requirement that counsel act like a "reasonably competent attorney" is so
vague, that it provides no workable framework for courts to measure
attorney conduct.89 In fact, though it appears to be an objective standard of
reasonableness, it is actually a subjective test, because the definition of
reasonableness varies depending upon the particular beliefs of the judge.90
As courts are instructed to give much deference to counsel's tactical
decisions, they will generally find some way to attribute any errors or
omissions to a tactical choice. 91  Further, although judges can turn to
standards of conduct such as those promulgated by the American Bar
Association as guides for evaluating performance, they do not have to abide
("Strickland adversely affects the public because questionable representation by attorneys is often
not evaluated if their conduct did not prejudice the outcome of the case.").
86. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
87. Levinson, supra note 5, at 165; see Gable & Green, supra note 63, at 764 (demonstrating that
if the court determines that counsel's performance didn't prejudice the defense, it will not be
evaluated, so questionable representation may go unchecked).
88. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 708.
90. Green, supra note 29, at 676. Standards such as those propagated by the American Bar
Association represent the current consensus as to what constitutes effective lawyering. See ABA
GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES § 10.1(A) (rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter DEATH PENALTY GUIDELINES], available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/deathpenaltyguidelines2003.
pdf. For example, the ABA standards state that defense counsel must: conduct an early investigation
to determine any weaknesses in the prosecution's case and uncover mitigating evidence, limit their
caseloads so they can provide each client with high quality representation, retain a mitigation
specialist and fact investigator, and conduct a thorough investigation as to issues relating to guilt and
penalty. Id. at §§ 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.7. However, since judges are not bound by these standards,
they do not have to follow any specific checklists for conduct, so they are given free reign in
evaluating counsel's conduct.
91. Levinson, supra note 5, at 165. Generally, if counsel has a justifiable reason for making an
error or omission, courts will approve of this tactical decision. Id. Conduct which the court deems
in hindsight to be based on strategy, may in fact have been a mere error or omission. As a result,
choices which appear to be strategic on the surface but are actually baseless slip under the radar as
courts do not look to the decision underlying the choice. Id. at 166.
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by them. 92 Therefore, judges may find reasonable what would be deemed
ineffective under the standards. 
93
Courts are very eager to find some way to attribute conduct to strategy,
so it is very difficult for defendants to prevail. 94 Critics of Strickland argue
that if a defendant proves that counsel's performance was constitutionally
infirm, he should not have the additional heavy burden of demonstrating that
there is a reasonable probability that but for the errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.95 Critics urge that if the prejudice
prong is to be applied, it must be re-worked. Some suggest that the burden
should be shifted to the prosecution to prove a lack of prejudice, such that if
the defendant proved that counsel's performance was deficient, it would be
deemed ineffective assistance unless rebutted by the prosecution.96
Since the Sixth Amendment is concerned with providing fair
procedures, some argue that deficient performance alone constitutes a
constitutional violation. 97 By requiring the defendant to prove both deficient
performance and prejudice, the concern is that the prejudice prong "ignores
the independent procedural harm caused by the appointment of an
incompetent attorney. ,9 8 Regrettably, there are many examples of egregious
conduct that have been held by courts to be adequate, such as cases where
attorneys were intoxicated, abusing drugs, mentally ill, or sleeping during
the trial. 99 Yet, if the court determines that the conduct did not prejudice the
defense, it will go undeterred even though it was grossly incompetent. In
many states, if a defendant brings a claim for ineffective assistance, he or
she is collaterally estopped from bringing a subsequent civil malpractice
action.100 Therefore, if the ineffective assistance claim is dismissed for
92. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
93. Green, supra note 29, at 673.
94. See Gable & Green, supra note 63, at 765. This is propounded by the fact that an attorney's
reputation is at stake when a defendant brings a claim of ineffective assistance against him, so the
attorney will work hard to vigorously defend his or her conduct. Id.
95. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 716-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Gable & Green, supra note 63,
at 765-69; Gabriel, supra note 85, at 1276.
96. Green, supra note 29, at 676; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 716-17 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the defendant should merely have to show that there was a significant
chance that absent counsel's errors the result would have been different rather than the higher
standard of "reasonable probability").
97. Gabriel, supra note 85, at 1276-77 (arguing that deficient performance alone constitutes a
denial of effective assistance, so it should be sufficient to proving a constitutional violation
regardless of prejudice); Levinson, supra note 5, at 169 (stating that "the prejudice prong inherently
assumes that no injury is caused solely by the denial of procedural due process").
98. Levinson, supra note 5, at 177.
99. Kirchmeier, supra note 7, at 455. Courts have refused to hold that abuse of alcohol and drugs
is per se ineffective, so as not to create the presumption that these habits render attorneys
incompetent. Id. at 456. However, courts have held that when counsel sleeps through a substantial
portion of the trial it will be per se ineffective, but they are split as to what is meant by "substantial."
Id. at 462-63.
100. Gable & Green, supra note 63, at 766-77.
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failure to satisfy the prejudice prong, this egregious conduct cannot be
remedied. However, despite all of the criticism, it is conceded that the
existence of a prejudice prong is necessary for judicial economy. As one
commentator noted, "eliminating the prejudice prongs . . . would multiply
the number of claims and invite rampant second-guessing of
trial attorneys."' 0 '
The inadequacies of the Strickland standard are most apparent in the
context of capital cases. The right to effective assistance of counsel is vital
in capital cases, as the defendant's life is at stake. Thus, the consequences of
a malleable standard that allows egregious attorney conduct to go undeterred
are especially grave when a person's life is on the line.
C. Effective Assistance of Counsel in the Context of Capital Cases
1. Capital Trials
The well-established notion that criminal defense lawyers are necessities
and not luxuries is especially true in the case of capital trials. One
commentator has noted that "death sentences are doled out in capital cases
'not for the worst crimes but for the worst lawyers"' 102 Capital cases are
very complex, and much is at stake, as the defendant risks losing not only
his freedom but his life. Thus, the consequences of ineffective assistance of
counsel at the sentencing phase of a capital trial are especially grave.'0 3
Counsel should ideally be required to possess a greater degree of skill and
experience when representing capital defendants.' 04 Due to the heightened
gravity of capital trials, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
101. Levinson, supra note 5, at 163. Admittedly, the prejudice prong allows courts to ignore
strategic errors and questionable representation, but it is argued that "[w]hile this still may cheat
defendants out of procedural faimess, it can be viewed as a necessary evil in the name of judicial
economy." Id.
102. Spomer, supra note 3, at 520 (quoting Stephen S. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death
Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1864 (1994)).
103. DEATH PENALTY GUIDELINES, supra note 90, at § 1.1 (2003) (stating that counsel must make
"Iextraordinary efforts on behalf of the accused' throughout every stage of proceedings due to the
"extraordinary and irrevocable nature of the penalty") (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993)).
104. In the introductory commentary to these guidelines, one writer is quoted as saying, "[elvery
task ordinarily performed in the representation of a criminal defendant is more difficult and time-
consuming when the defendant is facing execution." Id. (quoting Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse
Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV.
329, 357-58 (1995)). In addition to the normal pressures in preparing for trial, defense counsel in
capital cases are faced with psychological and emotional pressures, as a person's life is in their
hands. Id.
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counsel's conduct must be scrutinized closely to ensure procedural fairness
and accurate factfinding.105
"[C]apital trials are bifurcated into a guilt phase and a . . . sentencing
phase. °10 6  If the defendant is found guilty, a sentencing phase ensues, in
which the trier of fact determines whether or not to impose the death
penalty. 107 In most capital cases, the focus is on the issue of punishment, as
there is rarely a plausible argument for innocence. 108 During the sentencing
phase, evidence pertaining to aggravating and mitigating factors is
presented.109 The prosecution can present "any evidence relevant to a
statutorily defined aggravating circumstance," and the defense is free to
present anything it finds to be a mitigating circumstance. °"0 Mitigating
evidence is used to persuade the trier of fact to show mercy on the defendant
because "his character or background indicates that he will be rehabilitated,
will be harmless in prison, or does not deserve to die for some other
reason."'. This type of evidence is not used to justify the defendant's
actions, but to explain them. 1 2 In most states, the death penalty can only be
imposed if the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. 3 When
effectively presented, mitigation evidence often evokes feelings of
compassion and sympathy among the jurors, causing them to spare the life
of the defendant. 11 4 Since all the defense needs is one juror to vote for life
105. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 704 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that
the Court has always recognized a great need for procedural safeguards in capital cases, as the right
to counsel was recognized in capital cases long before it was established in all felony cases).
106. Spomer, supra note 3, at 508.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 518.
109. Id. at 508.
110. Id. at 518 (internal quotations omitted).
111. Levinson, supra note 5, at 171; Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The
Moral Politics of Death Penalty Abolitionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 325, 331-33 (1996)
(stating that mitigating evidence humanizes the defendant).
In his concurring opinion in Strickland, Justice Brennan pointed out that during the sentencing
phase, it is vital that the jury have "all possible relevant information about the individual defendant
whose fate it must determine", thus "the sentencer ... must be permitted to consider any relevant
mitigating factor." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 705 (1984). However, he adds that this
right is worthless if counsel fails to investigate or present mitigating evidence. Id. at 706.
112. DEATH PENALTY GUIDELINES, supra note 90, at § 10.11, cmt. Generally, counsel looks to
such things as the defendant's family, social, educational, employment, and prior correctional
histories, to formulate a human narrative. Frequently, capital defendants have sordid life histories
involving abuse, neglect, and mental disorders. Alfieri, supra note 11, at 332-33. Defense
attorneys often employ victimization theory to show how a defendant's life experiences have
impacted his conduct, to serve as an explanation for his or her crime. Id. Mitigation evidence is
usually presented in the form of testimony by family, friends, teachers, and mental health
professionals. Id. at 332. Although it can be a very time-consuming task to obtain mitigating
evidence, if effectively presented, it frequently leads to the sparing of a defendant's life. Id. at 333.
113. Spomer, supra note 3, at 508.
114. Alfieri,supra note 111, at 333.
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imprisonment rather than death, mitigation evidence can be a very
powerful tool. "5
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases
Although the need for competent counsel is crucial in capital cases, the
reality is that there is a lack of effective attorneys in the capital system.
According to statistics, ninety percent of capital defendants are indigent. 16
Unfortunately, most court appointed attorneys are seriously under-
compensated, so they have limited time and resources to devote to the case,
and are often less willing to vigorously represent their clients."17 Thus, this
creates an inequality between the rich and the poor, because those
defendants who can afford to retain counsel often obtain better
representation than those who are indigent. 118
Capital cases consist of two phases," 19 so the attorney essentially has to
prepare for two separate trials, which requires much time and effort if done
effectively.120  Many attorneys make the mistake of focusing too much on
the guilt phase, and not enough on the sentencing phase.121 This works a
detriment to capital defendants, because more attention should be focused on
sparing the defendant's life at the sentencing phase, as there is rarely a
credible argument for innocence. 1
2
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court overturned death sentences due
to ineffective assistance of counsel. In Williams v. Taylor,123 the Court
115. Levinson, supra note 5, at 164.
116. Id. at 149.
117. Spomer, supra note 3, at 519.
118. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Professor, Univ. S. Cal. L. Sch., Keynote Address at the Honorable
James J. Gilvary Symposium on Law, Religion, & Social Justice: Evolving Standards of Decency in
2003-Is the Death Penalty on Life Support? (Oct. 9, 2003), 29 DAYTON L. REv. 201, 204 (2004).
Studies have shown that whether a capital defendant receives the death penalty is largely dependent
upon whether he has private counsel or a court-appointed attorney. Id. One study revealed that
capital defendants who had court-appointed attorneys were 2.6 times more likely to receive the death
penalty than those who had private counsel. Id.
119. Spomer, supra note 3, at 517. A capital trial consists of both the guilt phase and the
sentencing phase. Id. During the guilt phase the trier of fact determines whether or not the
defendant is guilty of the crime for which he has been charged. DEATH PENALTY GUIDELINES,
supra note 90, at § 1.1, cmt. If found guilty, there is a separate sentencing phase, in which the trier
of fact determines whether the defendant should be sentenced to death. Id.
120. See DEATH PENALTY GUIDELINES, supra note 90, at § 1.1, cmt (stating that because counsel
must prepare for "what are effectively two different trials . . . providing quality representation in
capital cases requires counsel to undertake correspondingly broad investigation and preparation").
121. Spomer,supra note 3, at 519.
122. Id.
123. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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found both deficient performance and prejudice for counsel's failure to
investigate and present mitigating evidence. 24  The defendant, Williams,
confessed to killing an elderly man.125  At the sentencing phase, the
prosecution proved that he had two prior convictions, described two auto
thefts and violent assaults that he had committed after the murder, and
introduced his written confessions of the murder into evidence. 26 Defense
counsel introduced weak mitigation evidence that was of little use, and
Williams was sentenced to death. 27 Williams brought a claim of ineffective
assistance for counsel's failure to introduce five categories of significant
mitigating evidence. 28  Specifically, Williams asserted that counsel had
failed to uncover and introduce the following: 1) evidence of his
background; 2) that he had been abused by his father; 3) testimony from
prison officials stating that Williams did not pose a threat while incarcerated,
that he had helped break up a drug ring in prison, and had returned a guard's
wallet; 4) several character witnesses, including a well-respected accountant;
5) and that Williams was borderline mentally retarded. 29  Applying the
Strickland standard, the Court focused not on whether this evidence should
have been presented, but whether counsel conducted a reasonable
investigation into Williams' background. 3 0 The Court found that counsel's
failure to discover this mitigation evidence was unjustified, because a
reasonably competent attorney would have conducted a thorough
investigation of the defendant's background. 3' Further, had the jury been
apprised of the evidence pertaining to his dysfunctional childhood and
mental condition, there is a reasonable probability that it may have
convinced the jury to spare his life. 132 Thus, counsel's failure to discover
and present this evidence constituted deficient performance and prejudiced
the defense. 1
33
124. Id. at 395-96.
125. Id. at 367-68.
126. Id. at 368.
127. Id. at 369-70. Specifically, counsel had reviewed evidence that Williams had been
committed when he was eleven years old, had suffered abuse and neglect as a child, and was
borderline mentally retarded, yet failed to introduce this. Id. at 370. Instead, counsel decided to
focus their defense on the fact that Williams had voluntarily confessed to the crimes, in hopes that
the jurors would take mercy on him and spare his life. Id. at 373.
128. Id. at372-73.
129. Id. at 372-73 n.4.
130. Id. at 396.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 399.
133. Id. at 398-99. Counsel failed to conduct an investigation into Williams' childhood, not for
strategic reasons, but because they erroneously believed that state law forbade access to these
records. Id. at 395. The Court found that a reasonably competent attorney would have pursued these
leads and conducted a thorough investigation into Williams' background. Id. at 396.
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Similarly, in Wiggins v. Smith 134, the Court overturned a death sentence
for counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence.
135
Wiggins was found guilty for the robbery and death of an elderly woman. 1
36
Counsel filed a motion to bifurcate the sentencing phase, because they hoped
to first prove that he did not actually kill the woman by his own hand, and
then to present a mitigation case if necessary. 137  The court denied the
motion. 138 Although counsel told the jury in its opening statement that they
would hear evidence of Wiggins' difficult life, at no point during the
proceedings did they introduce any evidence of his life history. 39 Instead,
counsel attempted to prove that Wiggins was not directly responsible for the
murder, and the only mitigation evidence presented was his lack of prior
convictions. 4 0 The jury ultimately sentenced him to death. '4'
Wiggins filed a claim of ineffective assistance for counsel's failure to
investigate and present evidence of his life history. 142 Unlike Williams, in
which counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence, here
counsel actually conducted quite a bit of investigation which they
nevertheless failed to present. 143 Counsel retained a psychologist to conduct
tests, which revealed that Wiggins had a low IQ, difficulty dealing with
demanding situations, and a personality disorder.'" They also had a one-
page report documenting his miserable youth and time spent in foster care,
as well as records of his placement in foster care. 14' Although they had
funds available to obtain a social history report, which would have revealed
that Wiggins had suffered severe physical and sexual abuse as a youth,
counsel chose not to pursue this.' 46  Their decision not to further their
investigation fell below prevailing standards of both the state and the
American Bar Association.147 The Court held that a reasonably competent
134. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
135. Id. at 534.
136. Id. at 514-15.
137. Id. at 515.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 516.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 518.
144. Id. at 523.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 516-18.
147. Id. at 524. At the time, the prevailing standard in Maryland was to prepare a social history
report. Id. The American Bar Association standards said that "investigations into mitigating evidence
'should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to
rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor."' Id.
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attorney would have seen that it was necessary to pursue these mitigation
leads to make an informed decision about the defense. 148 The Court pointed
out that "Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every
conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort
would be to assist the defendant at sentencing. Nor does Strickland require
defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing -in every
case."' 149 However, it held that strategic choices made before conducting a
complete investigation must be reasonable in terms of prevailing
professional norms. 5 ° Thus, the Court held that counsel's decision not to
present mitigating evidence was unreasonable because they failed to expand
their investigation as a reasonable attorney would have done given the
available information. '' Further, this failure prejudiced the defense in that
had the jury been presented with this favorable mitigation evidence, it is
reasonable to assume that it may have come back with a different verdict. '52
These two cases represent an important movement in ineffective
assistance jurisprudence. Although Strickland was decided in 1984, the
Supreme Court did not invalidate a death sentence under Strickland until
their 2000 decision, Williams v. Taylor.'3 In Strickland, counsel failed to
investigate and present any mitigating evidence, because it felt any
investigation would be fruitless. 114 But, in Williams and Wiggins, the Court
held that unless counsel uncovers information that leads them to believe that
either a mitigation case would be of little help, or that further investigation
would be fruitless, they have an "obligation to conduct a thorough
investigation of the defendant's background." '  Further, the holding in
Wiggins essentially makes it easier for defendants to meet the performance
prong under Strickland, because "Wiggins overturns a death sentence based
on attorney performance that is better than the attorney performance in
Strickland."'156  Not only did the attorney in Strickland fail to present
mitigating evidence, he even failed to investigate any. On the other hand,
counsel in Wiggins conducted a limited investigation, but their performance
was deemed deficient because they unreasonably failed to further their
investigation. As one commentator pointed out, "failing to investigate
148. Id. at 525. The Court distinguished this from Strickland, in which the decision not to conduct
further investigation was justified, as counsel had reason to believe that further investigation would
be fruitless due to the overwhelming evidence against the defendant and the lack of mitigating
factors. Id. Here, based on the evidence reviewed by counsel, there was no reason for them to
believe that further investigation would be fruitless. Id.
149. Id. at 533.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 535.
152. Id. at 536.
153. Green, supra note 29, at 670 n.200.
154. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
155. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525.
156. Green, supra note 29, at 673.
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evidence is worse than failing to present evidence under Strickland because
attorneys who fail to investigate cannot make 'reasonable'
strategic decisions."' 57
Effective assistance of counsel and death penalty jurisprudence have
developed together over time. Since the Court has consistently
acknowledged that the death penalty, when arbitrarily handed out, violates
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 15 8 "the
standards for the imposition of the death penalty are scrutinized
carefully."' 5 9  Just as the Court has begun to scrutinize counsel's
performance more carefully in capital cases, as exhibited in both Williams
and Wiggins, the Justices have also begun to examine whether the death
penalty can be administered fairly.
3. Death Penalty Jurisprudence
In the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia16 , the Supreme Court held that the
then-existing Georgia death penalty statute was unconstitutional, as it
violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 16' Although this case stood for the proposition that the death
penalty itself is unconstitutional, "[s]tates temporarily discontinued capital
punishment out of confusion."' 162 Then, in 1976, the Court, in Gregg v.
Georgia,163 held that the death penalty is constitutional so long as it is
administered fairly and certain procedural requirements are met. 164
From 1976 to 2002, the Supreme Court denied review in most death
penalty cases, and when it did grant review, it rarely reversed death
sentences.165 However, recent death penalty decisions suggest a change in
trend. In 2000, the Supreme Court reversed a death sentence due to the
ineffective assistance of counsel in Williams v. Taylor. 166 Then, in 2002, the
157. Id. at 672-73.
158. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (requiring certain procedural requirements to be
met in order for the death penalty to meet constitutional muster); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (holding that the death penalty statute in effect at the time violated the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding
that the death penalty for the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the death penalty for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment).
159. Levinson, supra note 5, at 158.
160. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
161. Id. at 238.
162. Levinson, supra note 5, at 158.
163. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
164. Id. at 153.
165. Chemerinsky, supra note 118, at 208.
166. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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Supreme Court held that the death penalty for the mentally retarded is
unconstitutional. 167 Next, it reversed another death sentence for ineffective
assistance of counsel in Wiggins v. Smith, 168 and just last term it ruled that
the death penalty for juveniles is unconstitutional. 169
III. FACTS
James Scanlon was murdered in his bar on the morning of January 14,
1988.170 He was found dead, his body having been repeatedly stabbed and
set on fire. 17' Ronald Rompilla was indicted for Scanlon's murder and
related offenses, and the Commonwealth gave notice of intent to seek the
death penalty. 172 The court appointed Rompilla two public defenders, and
he was ultimately found guilty on all counts. 173  During the sentencing
phase, the prosecution sought to prove three aggravating circumstances to
justify imposition of the death penalty: "that the murder was committed in
the course of another felony; that the murder was committed by torture; and
that Rompilla had a significant history of felony convictions indicating the
use or threat of violence." 174 The jury found this evidence persuasive. 175
Although defense counsel knew the prosecution intended to use
Rompilla's prior rape and assault convictions to demonstrate his violent
character as an aggravating factor, they did not examine the prior conviction
file.176 Further, counsel did not obtain Rompilla's school, medical, police,
and prison records to determine whether or not they contained useful
mitigating information. 77 Rather, defense counsel interviewed Rompilla,
who stated that his childhood had been normal, and five of his family
members, who all stated that they believed he was innocent. 178  Then,
counsel arranged for three mental health experts to evaluate Rompilla's
mental state at the time of the offense, but their reports failed to reveal any
useful information. 179 Accordingly, defense counsel's mitigation case
consisted of the testimony of Rompilla's five family members. 180  In
addition, Rompilla's fourteen-year-old son testified as to his love for his
167. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
168. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
169. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
170. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 377-78.
173. Id. at 378.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 383.
177. Id. at 382.
178. Id. at 381-82.
179. Id. at 382.
180. Id. at 381-82 (stating that they believed he was both innocent and a good person).
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father, and his intent to visit him in prison.'' Consequently, the jury found
two mitigating factors: that his son had testified on his behalf and that there
was a possibility for rehabilitation. 182  However, the jury ultimately
determined that the aggravating factors outweighed this mitigating evidence,
and sentenced Rompilla to death. 183 Both the conviction and death sentence
were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 1
8 4
Armed with new lawyers, Rompilla sought state post-conviction relief,
filing claims that included one for ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to present significant mitigating evidence of his life history.'85
However, the court affirmed the conviction and death sentence and denied
relief, finding that counsel conducted an adequate investigation in
preparation of its mitigation case. 86 Rompilla then filed an application for
re-argument to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which was denied by a
per curiam order of the court. 187  Next, Rompilla petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court, arguing that both the conviction and
sentence should be overturned.' 88 The court refused to overturn the finding
of guilt, but granted the petition as to the sentencing phase for ineffective
181. Id. at 378.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. Rompilla claimed that counsel failed to present evidence pertaining to his childhood,
mental health, and alcoholism. Id. Specifically, he asserted that counsel failed to obtain records that
would have assisted the mental health experts in their evaluations of him as they documented low
test scores, a low IQ, and alcohol abuse. Commonwealth v. Rompilla, 721 A.2d 786, 789 (Pa.
1998).
186. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 374, 378. The mental health experts diagnosed him as a sociopath, but
found nothing helpful to his case. Rompilla, 721 A.2d at 790. The court found that just because
Rompilla has now found two mental health experts who conclude that he has brain damage, does not
negate the fact that counsel conducted an investigation as to his mental state. Id. Similarly, although
Rompilla and his family members now claim that counsel failed to disclose mitigation evidence such
as the fact that he was abused as a child, this information was never revealed to counsel before trial
in their interviews with Rompilla and his family. Id. Since they did not provide counsel with this
information previously, counsel was led to believe that their only hope of sparing Rompilla's life
was to beseech the jury to have mercy on him. Id.
187. Commonwealth v. Rompilla, 1999 Pa. LEXIS 105, at *1 (Jan. 19, 1999).
188. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 374, 379. In order to apply for a writ of habeas corpus, the applicant
must have first exhausted all of the available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2004). In
addition, an application will not be granted as to any claim judged on the merits in state court, unless
the adjudication:
1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
or
2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (2004).
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assistance of counsel, holding that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had
unreasonably applied Strickland as to the sentencing phase. 189 In making its
determination, the court found that counsel failed to investigate obvious
signs that Rompilla had a dysfunctional childhood, mental illness and
suffered from alcoholism. 190  The Commissioner of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections appealed the granting of Rompilla's habeas
corpus petition.' 9' The appeal was heard before a Third Circuit panel, which
was composed of three judges. 192  In a divided opinion, the Third Circuit
reversed the district court's decision as to the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, holding that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had not
unreasonably applied the Strickland standard. 193 The majority found that
counsel did make reasonable efforts to uncover mitigation material by
interviewing Rompilla and several of his family members, as well as
consulting with three mental health experts. 194  Although the majority
conceded that counsel did not search through relevant records pertaining to
Rompilla's background, it "saw the... investigation as going far enough to
leave counsel with reason for thinking further efforts would not be a wise
use of the limited resources they had."' 95 However, the dissenting judge felt
that counsel had unreasonably relied on their interviews with Rompilla's
family and the mental health experts to determine which records might be
useful, and believed that counsel should have expanded their investigation
189. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 374, 379. Even though neither Rompilla nor his family were
forthcoming about his alcoholism or dysfunctional childhood, the court found that given what
counsel knew about Rompilla's criminal background, there were signs that he may have suffered
from alcoholism and had a difficult childhood. Rompilla v. Horn, No. 99-737, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9620, at *39 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 2000). The court was reluctant to find counsel's performance
deficient, as it noted that counsel performed "so admirably according to [its] review of the record.
But ... they had reason to know of [his] past and should not have relied on [him] alone or his family
to reveal the true nature of his background." Id. In addition, the court found prejudice because the
jury's lack of information about Rompilla's mental capacity, alcoholism, and abusive childhood, was
sufficient to warrant a finding that had this been presented, there was a reasonable probability that
the result might have been different. Id. at *40-41.
190. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 374, 379.
191. Id. (citing Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2004)).
192. Id. at 379.
193. Id. Of note is the fact that Justice Samuel Alito, recent appointee to the United States
Supreme Court, authored this Third Circuit decision upholding Rompilla's death sentence. Rompilla
v. Horn, 359 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2004). The implications of this are discussed later in the article. See
infra notes 306-3 10.
194. Id.
195. Id. Based on their interviews with Rompilla and his family, as well as the consultations with
the mental health experts, counsel concluded that there was no reason to believe further investigation
into Rompilla's records would be useful. Id. Thus, the majority felt they were justified in stopping
their investigation where they did. Id. The majority's decision here is similar to the Supreme
Court's conclusion in Strickland, that if counsel's investigation leads them to believe that further
search would be fruitless, a limited investigation is justified. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 691 (1984). The majority then distinguished this case from Wiggins v. Smith, in which
counsel's limited search was unjustified because it yielded leads as to mitigating factors that a
reasonably competent attorney would have pursued. Rompilla, 454 U.S. at 374, 379.
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and obtained records on Rompilla's background. 96 Rompilla petitioned for
a rehearing, but his petition was denied by a six to five vote by the Third
Circuit. 197 In 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania unreasonably applied the
Strickland standard in holding that counsel's performance constituted
effective assistance. 1
98
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice Souter's Majority Opinion
This case calls for the Court to determine whether the conduct of
Rompilla's trial attorneys fell below the standard of reasonable competency
required of defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The constitutional
question before the Court is whether the Sixth Amendment requires counsel
to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material it knows the
prosecution will probably use as evidence of aggravating factors at the
sentencing phase, when it is suggested by both the capital defendant and his
family members that no mitigating evidence is available. 199
In his opinion, Justice Souter resolves this question through a two-prong
analysis. First, he analyzes whether counsel's conduct constituted deficient
performance under the first prong of the Strickland standard for effective
assistance of counsel.2 °°  Second, he examines whether counsel's errors
prejudiced the defense under the second prong of the Strickland test.20'
196. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 374, 379-80.
197. Id. at 380. Of note is the dissenting opinion, authored by Judge Nygaard, in which he stated
that counsel's failure to conduct even a cursory investigation into Rompilla's background constitutes
ineffective assistance, and falls below the prevailing professional norms. Rompilla v. Horn, 359
F.3d 310, 312 (3d Cir. 2004). Judge Nygaard also spoke of the lack of effective attorneys in capital
cases, and critiqued the Strickland standard as allowing too many cases of inept lawyering to be
deemed effective. Id. at 311. He asserted that "every death case in which a divided panel of the
court reverses a well-reasoned decision of the District Court that granted a writ of habeas corpus,
should raise in our minds 'a question of exceptional importance."' Id. at 310 n.1. In his opinion,
Judge Nygaard felt that given its importance, this case should not have been decided by a divided
panel, and felt that the court should have carefully examined the Strickland standard and set forth a
threshold for effective assistance. Id. at 312.
198. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 374, 380.
199. Id. at 377.
200. Id. at 380.
201. Id. at 390.
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1. Performance Prong Analysis
Under the first prong of Strickland, attorney performance is "measured
against an 'objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms."' 20 2  Further, Strickland mandates that courts must
examine performance in light of counsel's perspective at the time, and give
much deference to counsel's decisions.20 3
Justice Souter begins his analysis by stating that many of counsel's
decisions are debatable. 204 However, he concedes that "[t]his is not a case in
which defense counsel simply ignored their obligation to find mitigating
evidence." 205 He then examines counsel's investigation, and concludes that
none of the sources were very helpful in building a mitigation case.20 6 Next,
202. Id. at 380.
203. Id. at 381. Justice Souter reiterates the Court's findings in Strickland, in which it stated that
"[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the
variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how
best to represent a criminal defendant." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984).
According to the American Bar Association standards, defense counsel must begin planning and
investigation for both the guilt and sentencing phases immediately, which requires counsel to
coordinate its strategies at both phases of the capital trial. DEATH PENALTY GUIDELINES, supra note
90, at § 1.1, cmt. Thus, Justice Souter is referring to the decisions made by counsel in planning and
strategizing how best to present their defense. This could include decisions as to how to go about
uncovering mitigating evidence, and whether and to what extent mitigating evidence should be
presented. See id.
204. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381.
205. Id. He points out that although they had a very busy workload as public defenders, they still
took the time to interview Rompilla and his family members, and examined reports of the three
mental health experts. Id. This is noteworthy, considering that in the habeas corpus proceedings in
the federal district court, counsel stated that when he was handling Rompilla's case, his office had
two investigators and 2,000 cases. Rompilla v. Horn, No. 99-737, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9620, at
*37 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 2000). Public defenders are often faced with heavy caseloads and limited
resources, and they are often unable to devote the time and resources necessary to make a complete
investigation of a defendant's background. Rompilla's counsel stated that he routinely starts by
talking to the client and the family, and if they are able to shed light on a possible mitigating factor,
he will further develop that lead. Id. at *37. However, if nothing develops from conversations with
the client and his family, he admitted that "[t]here's a certain point in time when you have two or
three thousand cases in a year that you have to deal with some of the things your client tells you and
give that some full faith and credit and rely on it." Id. Although Justice Souter acknowledges the
difficulties faced by public defenders, he holds that based on the facts known to counsel in this
particular case, they had a duty to take their investigation a bit further. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383.
This decision is important because it indicates that the Court is willing to hold counsel ineffective
even in cases where counsel's performance was neither nonexistent nor terrible. See Garrett, supra
note 14, at 53.
206. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381. Rompilla was uninterested in helping them build a mitigation
case, and at one point told counsel that he was "'bored being here listening"', after which he
returned to his cell. Id. When questioned about his background, he maintained that his childhood
and schooling had been normal except for quitting school in the ninth grade. Id. Counsel had
spoken with Rompilla's relatives numerous times, but they did not provide any useful information,
as they admitted that they didn't really know Rompilla very well since he had spent much of his life
in custody. Id. at 381-82. However, it was pointed out to counsel during the habeas corpus
proceedings in the federal district court, that it may have been "more prudent to go beyond the client
and beyond those who may have abused the client to look for other indications of abuse" given the
fact that they might be reluctant to discuss this sensitive issue. Rompilla v. Horn, No. 99-737, 2000
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Justice Souter points out some of counsel's shortcomings by listing the
numerous avenues they could have followed to uncover helpful information
in building their mitigation case, such as school and prison records.20 7
Although he recognizes that the duty to investigate does not require an
attorney to "scour the globe on the off-chance something will turn up", he
states that at least some of these avenues probably should have been
explored.208 However, Justice Souter does not focus his analysis on these
other avenues, because he found that the failure to examine Rompilla's prior
conviction file was enough in itself to constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel.209
Justice Souter argues that counsel's failure to examine the prior
conviction file constitutes deficient performance, as it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. First, he avers that counsel knew the
prosecution planned to introduce evidence of Rompilla's prior conviction to
emphasize his violent character, and even though it was readily available,
they did not examine it until the day before the sentencing phase.2 10
Analyzing the situation through the eyes of counsel at that time, Justice
Souter states that a reasonable attorney would have realized that he would
seriously jeopardize his client's case if he failed to examine the prior
conviction file, as it would limit his ability to respond to the aggravating
evidence.2 1 He stresses that counsel had a duty to "make all reasonable
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9620, at *24 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 2000). Although counsel stated that the reports
written by the mental health experts did not reveal anything helpful, one of the doctors attached a
note at the end of his report stating that there was a possibility that Rompilla could become violent
while under the influence of alcohol, which he felt warranted further evaluation. Id. at *32-33.
However, counsel did nothing to further explore this. Id. at *33.
207. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 382. Justice Souter argues that the school records should have been
examined, especially because Rompilla admitted that he dropped out of school in the ninth grade,
and his family members shed so little light on his childhood. Id. Further, they knew he had a
criminal record, yet failed to consult his prison records. Id. Finally, they learned from the police
report that he had been drinking heavily at the time the crime was committed, and had been advised
by one of the mental health experts that he was prone to violent behavior when drinking, yet they did
not look to see whether he had a history of substance abuse. Id.
As one commentator noted, "[tihere is always mitigating evidence .... [and] [w]hile the
Supreme Court has said, 'reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason
to think further investigation would be a waste,' . . . if the attorneys haven't found compelling
mitigation evidence, by definition it is not reasonable for them to stop." Garrett, supra note 14, at
53.
208. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 383-84. Counsel was warned by the prosecution that it planned to introduce a
transcript of the rape victim's testimony from the earlier proceeding to prove the prior conviction.
Id. Counsel did not look at the transcript until the night before the sentencing phase, and even after
they obtained the file, counsel did not look at any of the other material in the file. Id. at 385.
211. Id.
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efforts" to learn about the prior offense, which included obtaining the prior
conviction file.112 To support this view, Justice Souter turns to the American
Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, which state that the attorney
has a duty to explore all avenues which might lead to relevant mitigating
information, which includes "efforts to secure information in the possession
of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities.
'
,
2 1 3
Justice Souter rejects the position taken by the state post-conviction
courts that counsel was justified in failing to examine the prior conviction
file because they attempted to find mitigating evidence by other means.
2 14
His main argument is that if given the option between reviewing a file that
contains information that counsel knows the prosecution will use or
questioning the defendant or his family as to whether they have any useful
information, a reasonable attorney would choose the former as it is a sure
bet. 215  Also critical to his determination that counsel's performance was
212. Id. Justice Souter argues that it is essential for counsel to examine prior conviction files as
they will know in advance what the prosecution can argue, so there will be no surprises, and it will
give them time to prepare an argument to counteract the aggravating factor. Id. at 385-86. This is
consistent with the ruling in Williams v. Taylor, which held that counsel has an obligation to conduct
a thorough investigation of a defendant's background. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396
(2000). Similarly, in Wiggins v. Smith, counsel had reviewed social services records, which revealed
that Wiggins had a low IQ, features of a personality disorder, and had been in and out of the foster
care system throughout his youth, yet counsel failed to expand their investigation to further these
mitigation leads. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). The Court ultimately held that
counsel's performance was deficient because a reasonably competent attorney would have realized
that it was necessary to pursue these leads in order to make an informed decision as to what line of
defense to pursue for his client. Id. at 525. Much like Wiggins, Rompilla's counsel were aware of
the circumstances of his prior conviction, its similarity to the present crime, and the prosecution's
plan to use the prior conviction to prove an aggravating circumstance. As in Wiggins, counsel failed
to further investigate by examining the prior conviction file. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 386. The
majority applies the Court's reasoning from Wiggins to hold that counsel's performance fell below
the level of a reasonably competent attorney. Id. at 390.
213. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 4-4.1 (3d. ed. 1993)). Although Strickland made clear that American Bar
Association Standards and the like are only to be used as guides and should not be construed to
create checklists for attorney conduct, the Court has often turned to them in determining whether
attorney conduct was reasonable. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
The Court points to the case of Wiggins v. Smith, which involved similar facts as those present here,
as another example of when the Court turned to the American Bar Association Standards in making
their determination whether counsel's performance was reasonable. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.
There, the Court cited the American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, which state that "investigations into mitigating
evidence 'should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and
evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor."' Id. at 524.
The current ABA Guidelines go even further by specifically requiring counsel to investigate prior
convictions that could either be used as aggravating circumstances or be introduced into evidence in
another way. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 n.7.
In Strickland, the Court refrained from imposing set rules or checklists for attorney conduct,
because it felt this would impair counsel's ability to employ creative strategies and detract from
zealous advocacy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. But in relying so heavily on these ABA standards,
this suggests that the Court may in fact be using these as checklists for attorney conduct.
214. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 388-89.
215. Id. at 389.
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deficient, was the fact that the file was readily available to counsel, so there
was no reasonable excuse for failing to obtain it for review.216 Thus, he
holds that the state courts were unreasonable in holding that counsel was
justified in failing to make any effort to review the file.217 However, Justice
Souter carefully limits his decision to the particular fact pattern in this case,
admitting that in situations where defense counsel is unaware of the
prosecution's intention to use a prior conviction as an aggravating
circumstance, his performance may be assessed differently.218
2. Prejudice Prong Analysis
In order to satisfy the prejudice prong under Strickland, there must be a
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. 2 1 9  Justice Souter
examines the prejudice claim de novo, since the state courts never even
reached this issue because they found counsel's performance to be
adequate. 220  He concludes that Rompilla has proven beyond any doubt that
counsel's errors prejudiced the defense.221
First, he states that if counsel had looked in Rompilla's prior conviction
file they would have found mitigation leads that they did not find elsewhere,
such as his prison file, which described his traumatic childhood and mental
216. Id.
217. Id. at 389-90. In Strickland the Court held that
[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too
tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse
sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Therefore, the Court held that courts must indulge a strong presumption
that any error or omission was the result of sound trial strategy. Id. However, this is the third
decision in the past five years in which the Court has overturned death sentences due to ineffective
assistance of counsel during sentencing, so the Court seems to be giving less deference to counsel's
decisions, and making a strong effort to correct poor lawyering in capital cases. See Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 510; Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 374. For example, in
both Williams and Wiggins, the Court held that no tactics could justify counsel's failure to
investigate and present mitigating evidence, and that their errors were due to neglect and not
strategy. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 393; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 526. Instead of just attributing the
error to strategy, the Court is now closely scrutinizing counsel's conduct to determine whether the
act or omission was a legitimate tactical decision.
218. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390. Justice Souter makes this statement in order to redress the
dissent's concern that the majority has created a bright-line rule requiring counsel to conduct "a
complete review of the file on any prior conviction introduced." Id.
219. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
220. Id.
221. Id.
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health. 222 Based on their limited investigation, counsel was led to believe
that Rompilla had a normal childhood. However, the contents of the file
indicated the exact opposite, revealing the fact that he had been raised in the
slums, had been incarcerated many times, exhibited symptoms of
schizophrenia and other mental disorders, and tested at a third-grade level of
cognition.223 Justice Souter believes that if counsel had been confronted
with this information, they "would have become skeptical of the impression
given by the five family members and would unquestionably have gone
further to build a mitigation case. 224 Thus, this would essentially create a
domino effect, as each piece of information uncovered would lead counsel to
pursue further investigation.
Justice Souter argues that they presumably would have discovered the
material uncovered by Rompilla's post-conviction attorneys, which revealed
that his parents were severe alcoholics; his mother drank while pregnant
with him; his father was physically abusive to him; and on at least one
occasion he was locked in an outdoor dog pen filled with excrement. 225
Second, when presented with this information, the mental health experts
who were retained during the post-conviction proceedings found that this
indicated a need to test further.226 The tests revealed that Rompilla "'suffers
from organic brain damage, an extreme mental disturbance significantly
impairing several of his cognitive functions . . . likely caused by fetal
alcohol syndrome"' which impaired his ability to conform his conduct to
the law. 227
Finally, Justice Souter asserts that these results would probably have led
counsel to look at Rompilla's school and juvenile records, which
documented his mother's alcoholism and neglect of her children, as well as
the fact that his IQ placed him in the mentally retarded range. 28
Justice Souter concludes that all of this evidence taken together is a far
cry from the "few naked pleas for mercy actually put before the jury., 229
222. Id. at 390-91.
223. Id. Had they reviewed the prison file, they would have realized that Rompilla's life history
was actually much different than how it had been depicted by both Rompilla and his family
members. For example, the record reveals that Rompilla was raised in the slums and at a young age
'started a series of incarcerations ... often of assaultive nature and commonly related to over-
indulgence in alcoholic beverages."' Id.
224. Id. at 391.
225. Id. at 392. This information was elicited from testimony of several of Rompilla's family
members during the post-conviction proceedings who had not been interviewed by trial counsel. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 393. The dissent criticizes the majority for basing their ruling on the assumption that
counsel would have discovered this information had they looked through the file, because the
majority cannot be certain that this would have actually been found. Id. at 405 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
229. Id. at 393. Mitigation evidence is not used to justify a defendant's conduct, but rather serves
to explain their actions. See Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories
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Although he acknowledges that there is a chance that even after hearing this
mitigation evidence the jury may still have sentenced Rompilla to death,
there is a reasonable probability that had this been presented to the jury it
may "'have influenced the jury's appraisal' of [Rompilla's] culpability. 23 °
B. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor writes separately merely to quell the dissent's fear that
the majority creates a per se rule that defense counsel must review all
documents of any prior conviction file that the prosecution might use at
trial. 23 1 She asserts that the majority does not create a bright-line rule, but
simply applies the traditional case-by-case approach to determining effective
assistance of counsel under Strickland.32 She then concludes that trial
counsel's performance was deficient because their failure to look at the prior
conviction was objectively unreasonable for three main reasons.233
and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 547, 560 (1995). Many capital defendants
have suffered from poverty, maltreatment, and neglect. Id. at 565. Thus, when information of a
defendant's life history is presented to the jury:
the goal is to place the defendant's life in a larger social context and, in the final analysis,
to reach conclusions about how someone who has had certain life experiences, been
treated in particular ways, and experienced certain kinds of psychologically-important
events has been shaped and influenced by them.
Id. at 561. While evidence of maltreatment, abuse, and neglect in no way minimizes the significance
of a defendant's crime, it may convince the jury that there is an explanation for the defendant's
actions, such that he or she deserves a life sentence but does not deserve to die.
The mitigation case presented to the jury by Rompilla's trial counsel consisted of testimony
from his family members that he was innocent and a good person. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 378. These
bare pleas did nothing to explain Rompilla's actions in the context of his life experiences. Arguably,
whenever a defendant is eligible for the death penalty, his or her loved ones will attempt to persuade
the jury that the defendant is a good person and deserves to live, seeing as he or she is family or a
close friend. However, in all likelihood, this information is not enough to convince the jury to spare
the defendant's life, because without more meat to these pleas, the jury is not given any explanation
as to why the defendant acted in this way to convince them that the death penalty is not warranted.
Thus, Justice Souter presumes that had the jury been aware of Rompilla's sordid life history, they
may have had a greater understanding as to why he did what he did given his life experiences, and
concluded that he did not deserve to die.
230. Rompilla, 545 at 393.
231. Id. at 393-94. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor clarifies the extent of the
Court's holding, and emphasizes its narrow application to the particular facts at hand. See id.
232. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). The failure to obtain the prior conviction file is similar to
counsel's failure to obtain a social history report in Wiggins v. Smith. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510, 524 (2003). Both were readily available and would have revealed important mitigation
information. Id. In both cases, the attorney's conduct fell below the prevailing professional
standards. However, Wiggins did not create a bright-line rule requiring counsel to obtain a
defendant's social history report in all capital cases, and the majority argues that no bright-line rule
is created here either.
233. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor states that the
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First, she contends that counsel knew that Rompilla's prior conviction
would be central to the prosecution's case. 3 The prosecution was
attempting to prove his prior rape conviction as an aggravating
circumstance, which would make him eligible for the death penalty.235 The
prior conviction was violent in nature and very similar to the crime for
which he was currently on trial, so the prosecutors intended to "use details of
the prior crime as powerful evidence that Rompilla was a dangerous man for
whom the death penalty would be both appropriate punishment and a
necessary means of incapacitation. 2 36 Thus, Justice O'Connor argues that a
reasonable defense attorney would have placed a high priority on reviewing
this prior conviction file in order to "anticipate and find ways of deflecting
the prosecutor's aggravation argument.' 237
Court came to this conclusion only after following Strickland's case-by-case approach to
determining whether an attorney's performance was deficient by analyzing their decisions in light of
all the circumstances. Id. Although the Court appears to stray from Strickland as it has given less
deference to counsel's tactical decisions in deciding that their failure to examine the prior conviction
file was unreasonable, Justice O'Connor insists that the Court is still following the Strickland
approach. Id. She continues her discussion by listing the reasons why, in light of the circumstances,
counsel's decision not to examine the prior conviction file was unreasonable. Id. at 394-96.
234. Id. at 394 (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to the American Bar Association standards,
counsel must investigate prior convictions that can be used as aggravating circumstances and should
"carefully consider whether all or part of the aggravating evidence may appropriately be challenged
as improper, inaccurate, misleading or not legally admissible." DEATH PENALTY GUIDELINES, supra
note 90, at 10.11(1). In order to determine what evidence the prosecution intended to introduce and
whether it was admissible, it was essential for counsel to examine the prior conviction file. Thus,
under Strickland, Justice O'Connor argues that counsel's failure to examine this file fell below the
objective standard of reasonable defense lawyering. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 394 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
235. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 394 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It appears as if defense counsel lost
faith in their ability to deflect the prosecution's powerful aggravation argument, so they saw no use
in looking at the prior conviction file. Yet the American Bar Association standards specifically state
that "counsel at every stage of the case have a continuing duty to investigate issues bearing upon
penalty and to seek information that supports mitigation or rebuts the prosecution's case in
aggravation." DEATH PENALTY GUIDELINES, supra note 90, at § 10.11(A). Of special concern to
Justice O'Connor is the fact that the prior conviction "went not to a collateral matter, but rather to
one of the aggravating circumstances making Rompilla eligible for the death penalty." Rompilla,
545 U.S. at 394 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Perhaps the Court would be willing to turn a blind eye
to the fact that counsel breached their duty to investigate had the prior conviction been something the
prosecution merely intended to mention in passing, but here it was central to their aggravation case.
See id. In Justice O'Connor's opinion, this made the blunder impossible to ignore and sweep under
the heading of a "tactical decision", because no reasonable attorney would have failed to at least
make a cursory review of the prior conviction file in preparation of its defense. Id. at 395.
236. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 394 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
237. Id. Yet the dissent argues that there was nothing in the file that could have weakened the
aggravating nature of his prior rape conviction, and the only way that counsel could have minimized
the force of this aggravating factor was through their argument to exclude the transcript, which was
ultimately unsuccessful. Id. at 405 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Kennedy also
points out that counsel was aware of Rompilla's prior convictions and the circumstances surrounding
them, and based on their conversations with Rompilla and his family, reasonably decided that it
would not be the best investment of their time and resources to review the entire file. Id. at 400-01
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). According to Strickland, courts are required to give much deference to
counsel's decisions and are to avoid analyzing attorney performance in hindsight. Strickland v.
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Second, Justice O'Connor asserts that the prosecution planned to use
Rompilla's prior conviction to counteract the defense's primary mitigation
argument of residual doubt as to his guilt. 23 8 Since the prior crime was so
similar to the one at hand, there was a strong probability that the residual
doubt argument would be rejected by the jury.239 Thus, Justice O'Connor
asserts that it was necessary for counsel to examine the prior conviction file
to determine whether they could salvage their residual doubt argument, or
whether they should abandon that argument and search for other
mitigating evidence.24 °
Third, counsel's decision not to obtain and review the prior conviction
file was not based on an informed tactical decision, but was due to
inattention. 241  According to Justice O'Connor, they did not make the
decision to forego examining the file in order to devote their time and efforts
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). In retrospect, counsel's decision to forego examination of
the file seems unreasonable, as we are now aware of the numerous mitigation leads that were present
in the file that counsel failed to discover through other means. However, if counsel's conduct was
reasonable given the circumstances at the time, Strickland states that courts cannot later claim that
counsel acted unreasonably. Id. at 691. One of the criticisms of Strickland is that it affords too
much deference to attorney conduct, so perhaps the majority is trying to remedy this by closely
scrutinizing whether counsel's conduct could really have been seen as reasonable at the time.
238. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 394 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that since
Rompilla's conviction was based on strong circumstantial evidence, the defense hoped to persuade
the jury that the death penalty should not be imposed due to residual doubt as to his guilt. Id. at 394-
95. However, the dissent asserts that residual doubt was not the main thrust of the mitigation
argument, but that counsel wanted to use the testimony of Rompilla's family to humanize him rather
than argue that he was innocent. Id. at 401 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 395 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
240. Id. Attorneys are not required to address every single issue or fact involved in a case, as it
may often be more effective to focus on a small number of main points. See Yarborough v. Gentry,
540 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (per curiam). Yarborough reinforced the finding in Strickland that "[w]hen
counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did
so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect." Id. at 8. Similarly, in Bell v. Cone, the
Court found that sometimes it is sound tactical judgment to omit certain evidence or arguments. 535
U.S. 685, 700 (2002). Thus, Justice O'Connor argues that had they looked at the file and decided
that it would be better to abandon the residual doubt argument, the Court would have upheld this
decision as sound tactical judgment. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 395 (O'Connor J., concurring).
241. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 395-96 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, it seems then, that applying
the strong presumption that attorney conduct was based on a tactical decision, the Court should have
upheld counsel's decision not to look at the file, because they made the decision to focus on other
sources for mitigation information. As the dissent points out, there is no evidence in the record to
show that counsel's decision was not strategic. Id. at 400-02 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Since the
justices cannot read the minds of counsel and determine whether their decisions were actually based
on strategy, they must make inferences. Thus, whether or not conduct is deemed to be based on
strategy is actually based on the assessment of the justices. One of the critiques of Strickland is that
ineffective assistance goes undeterred, because judges are eager to find some justifiable reason to
attribute errors to strategy. However, here the Court departs from precedent and closely scrutinizes
counsel's conduct, and given all of the circumstances, cannot find a reason why the failure to look
through the file could have been attributed to a sound tactical decision.
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to other crucial leads, nor did they "determine that the file was so
inaccessible or so large that examining it would necessarily divert them from
other trial-preparation tasks they thought more promising. ' 42 Rather, they
had ample warning and opportunity to obtain the file, but they unreasonably
failed to do so. 243 Although Justice O'Connor found counsel's performance
deficient under the particular circumstances in this case, she declares that
counsel's failure to obtain the file may not have been deemed deficient had it
resulted from a "reasoned strategic judgment."2"
C. Justice Kennedy's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennedy argues that the holding departs from the Court's Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence by distorting Strickland, which warned against
the creation of explicit guidelines or checklists for evaluating attorney
conduct.245 Yet he states that the majority's holding creates a per se rule that
defense counsel must "review all documents in what it calls the 'case file' of
any prior conviction that the prosecution might rely on at trial. 2 46 Further,
he asserts that this rule, if followed, will actually lead to less effective
assistance, by "taking resources away from other important tasks in order to
satisfy [this] rule., 247 Justice Kennedy declares that counsel's performance
was both adequate and conscientious.248 They made their best efforts to
develop a mitigation case, and as the Court has held before, "when a
defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain
242. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 395 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The majority could easily have
indulged this presumption and concluded, like the dissent, that counsel's conduct was reasonable,
but the Court is deciding to give less deference to counsel's conduct by closely analyzing their
decisions.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 396 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This supports her view that the Court has not created a
per se rule, and that these claims will still be decided on the traditional case-by-case approach.
While the majority's holding has created a framework for determining effective assistance, its
holding is very limited. This ruling provides no guidance as to how to rule on similar claims with
slightly different fact patterns, because Justice O'Connor does not expound upon how counsel's
omission here could have been found to be based on strategic judgment.
245. Id. at 396-97.
246. Id, at 396.
247. Id. at 397. Although it would have been beneficial for counsel to review the file in this case,
that may not be true for every case in the future. Since many court-appointed attorneys in capital
cases are severely under-compensated, the dissent fears that this ruling would require them to devote
some of their precious resources toward a complete examination of a prior conviction file, even if it
would not be the best use of their funds. See id. What happens if counsel does not have enough
resources to obtain and review a prior conviction file? For example, what if the attorney only has
enough resources to conduct a cursory review of the entire file, or examine part of the file? Would
this be considered sub-par performance even though he made attempts to investigate and it was
through no fault of his own that he had to cut short his investigation? The majority does not address
the issue, so it is unclear how they would deal with this in the future.
248. Id.
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investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue
those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable. 24 9
Justice Kennedy's main contention with the majority's holding is that it
radically departs from the standard set forth in Strickland. First, he argues
that by establishing this new per se rule the majority ignores Strickland's
warning against creating specific guidelines or checklists for attorney
conduct. 250 The Strickland Court felt that specific rules for attorney conduct
would not be able to take into account the varying circumstances in each
case or the wide range of legitimate strategies employed by defense
counsel.25 ' Thus, the ABA standards are to be used only as guides, and do
not form the framework by which to determine whether counsel was
effective. However, Justice Kennedy states that the majority ignores this
mandate and treats the ABA standards "as if they were binding statutory
text.' '252  Although the majority denies that they are creating a bright-line
rule, Justice Kennedy states that their opinion explicitly imposes a rigid
requirement on defense attorneys to review prior conviction files when the
prosecution intends to use those priors as aggravating circumstances.
2 3
Second, Justice Kennedy argues that the majority ignores Strickland's
demand that courts' review of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential.5 Here, counsel knew of Rompilla's prior convictions, and
although they did not obtain the prior conviction file, counsel had reviewed
249. Id. at 398 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691
(1984)).
250. Id. at 399-400 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Joining in the dissent are Justices Scalia and
Thomas, who also dissented in Wiggins v. Smith. Much like today, in Wiggins they stressed the fact
that the ABA standards are only to be used as guides. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 547 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, they are strict adherents to the standard set forth in Strickland.
251. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 399-400 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 400 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Critics of Strickland argue that it gives too much
deference to attorney conduct, allowing many cases of questionable conduct to go undeterred. See
Green, supra note 29, at 673. Since judges are not bound by the ABA standards in evaluating
attorney conduct, they are free to disregard them and often find to be reasonable what would be
deemed ineffective under the ABA standards. Id. Arguably, the ABA standards, which reflect
prevailing professional norms, are a better measure of reasonable conduct than a judge's subjective
belief. Perhaps the majority was thinking along these lines when it decided to closely adhere to the
standards in evaluating counsel's conduct.
253. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 400 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority's position is that when it
found counsel deficient for failing to examine the prior conviction file, its decision was carefully
limited to the particular facts of this case. Id. at 395 (O'Connor, J., concurring). They did not
automatically find counsel deficient for failing to look at the file before taking into account all of the
facts and circumstances in the case. Id. Rather, it was only after analyzing all of the facts, that the
majority decided that a reasonable attorney would have looked at the file and they found no
legitimate tactical reason to justify this error. Further, the majority explicitly states that other
situations might call for a different analysis. Id. at 389-90.
254. Id. at 401 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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documents relating to the priors, and strategically decided that it would not
be the best use of time or money to look through the file.255 Yet the majority
argues that anything short of a complete examination of the file constitutes
deficient performance. 56 But Justice Kennedy argues that their reasoning
behind the rule is flawed, as it is based on pure speculation; counsel might
have discovered information as to Rompilla's mental state and childhood
had they examined the file, but there is no absolute guarantee that this would
have been uncovered. 257 The majority assumes that it will require little time
and effort for counsel to review the file, but in reality it can be a very time
consuming task, as files sometimes comprise numerous boxes of
documents.258 Justice Kennedy asserts that this per se rule will actually lead
to less effective assistance, as counsel will be required to divert limited
resources from other tasks to fulfill this requirement, even if counsel has
reasonably concluded that reviewing a prior conviction file would be a waste
of time and effort. 25 9 Further, with this rule, there is the risk that a defendant
255. Id. at 401-02 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Wiggins v. Smith, counsel testified at
the post-conviction proceedings that although he did not obtain a social history report of the
defendant, he was aware of the defendant's troubled childhood. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 529. Thus,
Justices Scalia and Thomas held in the dissent that there was no need to get a social history report
when they were already aware of what it would reveal. See id. at 541 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Once
again they adhere to Strickland's requirement that counsel's decisions be given much deference, and
make the same finding. Justice Marshall cautioned in his dissenting opinion in Strickland that the
standard set out by the majority was so malleable and vague that it "[would] yield excessive
variation in the manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied by different
courts." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Strickland
has been criticized for allowing grossly incompetent conduct to go undeterred. Levinson, supra note
5, at 165. Since the Court refused to create any specific guidelines by which to measure attorney
conduct, the decision as to whether counsel acted reasonably is largely based on the judge's
subjective beliefs. Indeed, there are examples of egregious attorney conduct, such as showing up
intoxicated or sleeping during portions of the trial, which courts have held to be adequate under
Strickland. Kirchmeier, supra note 7, at 455. In this case, as well as Williams v. Taylor and Wiggins
v. Smith, the majority appears to grant less deference to counsel's decisions. Perhaps they are
reconsidering the Court's standard set in Strickland in light of all the criticism it has received.
256. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 401 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
257. Id. The mitigation leads that the majority speaks of were actually comprised of notations in
Rompilla's prison transfer petition, which was a ten-page document. Id. at 406 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Thus, the dissent argues that if counsel had examined the file to uncover evidence about
his prior convictions, they might not even have found these leads since they were contained in a
document that did not have details pertaining to his priors. Id. However, the majority is less
concerned with whether counsel would have actually discovered the mitigation leads in the file, than
the simple fact that they failed to even attempt to examine the file. Id. at 385-86. It was this
omission that the majority found to be objectively unreasonable. Id. at 383. If counsel had obtained
the file and made reasonable efforts to review it, and failed to discover these leads, it would be more
difficult to find their performance to be deficient.
258. Id. at 403 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
259. Id. Most court appointed attorneys are seriously under-compensated, so they have limited
time and resources to devote to the case, and are often less willing to vigorously represent their
clients. Spomer, supra note 3, at 519. So, arguably this ruling will provide more effective assistance
as it will require counsel to spend more time preparing their case. Although the majority's ruling
establishes more concrete guidelines for effective assistance, it is limited to the particular scenario in
this case. The majority did not make a broad ruling that anything less than what the ABA standards
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might try to overturn his conviction by arguing that counsel did not review
something in a prior conviction file. According to Justice Kennedy, "[t]his
elevation of needle-in-a-haystack claims to the status of constitutional
violations will benefit undeserving defendants and saddle States with the
considerable costs of retrial and/or resentencing.
' 260
Next, Justice Kennedy asserts that the Court errs in holding that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was incorrect and objectively unreasonable in
its holding that counsel provided effective assistance under Strickland.26 1
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed the precedent set by Strickland,
and gave much deference to counsel's conduct and held that counsel's
performance was adequate. 262 Justice Kennedy argues that it is this Court's
ruling, and not the state court's, that is unreasonable, and concludes that
"[t]he Pennsylvania courts can hardly be faulted for failing to anticipate
today's abrupt departure from Strickland.' 263
Lastly, Justice Kennedy maintains that even if the Court can establish
that counsel's performance was deficient, Rompilla cannot prove that
counsel's errors prejudiced his defense. 264 Nothing in the file detracts from
the violent nature of the prior conviction, and there is no way of saying
conclusively that had counsel looked in the file they would have come
across these mitigation leads that the majority speaks of.265  These leads
were actually located in one document-a prison transfer petition-and
Justice Kennedy argues that even if counsel had examined the file to obtain
information about Rompilla's prior conviction, they probably would not
have given much thought to this document because it did not pertain to his
prior conviction.266 Thus, he argues that if counsel were deficient in failing
require will be deemed deficient, but confined its rule to the narrow facts in this case. While this
decision indicates that the Court is attempting to create stricter standards for attorney conduct, one
could argue that it may not have as much of a far-reaching effect for future ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, as the case was decided on the narrowest possible means. However, it will likely set
the bar for future cases, requiring courts to evaluate attorney conduct more critically.
260. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 404 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 404-05.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 405 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent represents the Court's longstanding position
on ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Court strictly adheres to the precedent set in
Strickland, and fears that the majority's opinion represents a departure from this. However, given
the vast amount of criticism that Strickland has received, the majority's recent decisions indicate that
perhaps they are responding to this criticism and are making attempts to rework the standard set in
Strickland.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 405-06.
266. Id. at 406. Strickland stated that
Attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a
particular case as they are to be prejudicial. They cannot be classified according to
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to look at the file, there is no reasonable probability that looking in the file
would have led counsel to find the transfer petition and explore the leads.2 67
So, prejudice could only be found if counsel were deficient in failing to give
intense scrutiny to every document in the file.268
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Legal Impact
The Court's decision in Rompilla carries significant implications. First,
this is the third case in the past five years in which the Court has overturned
death sentences due to ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing, which
suggests that the Court is taking a stricter stance on lawyering in capital
cases. 26 9  Second, the Court further defines effective assistance by holding
that regardless of other mitigation efforts, if counsel knows of information
that the prosecution will probably rely on at the sentencing phase, he must
make all reasonable efforts to obtain and review it. 270  Third, this case
indicates a departure from precedent, as the Court looks more closely and
critically at counsel's performance, and appears to give more weight to the
American Bar Association standards and codes of conduct as to how to
likelihood of causing prejudice. Nor can they be defined with sufficient precision to
inform defense attorneys correctly just .what conduct to avoid. Representation is an art,
and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in
another. Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were unreasonable,
therefore, the defendant must show that they actually had an adverse effect on the
defense. It is not enough ... to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). Thus, the dissent argues that the failure to
obtain the prior conviction file could have just as easily been harmless as opposed to prejudicial,
because there is a likelihood that even had counsel looked through the file, they may not have
uncovered these mitigation leads. Further, the dissent avers that Rompilla is unable to show that the
failure to obtain and review the prior conviction file actually had an adverse effect on his defense,
because he cannot prove that counsel would have actually uncovered this information had they
looked in the file. See id.
Yet, one can argue that the dissent's argument is also speculative. While there is a possibility
that even had counsel examined the file they might not have discovered all of the mitigation leads,
they surely would have uncovered something, in addition to what they already knew, to help
Rompilla's mitigation case. There is no indication in the record that it would have required much
time and effort to examine the file. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390-91. Thus, it is unlikely that counsel
would have failed to come across these mitigation leads had they looked through the file.
267. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 406-07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
268. Id. The dissent's prejudice argument is perhaps even more convincing than that offered by
the majority. However, this is precisely one of the criticisms of Strickland; conduct that is clearly
deficient goes unchecked because defendants are unable to satisfy the prejudice prong. Some have
argued that a finding of deficient performance should be sufficient for deeming performance
ineffective, and if the prejudice requirement is to remain, the burden should be shifted to the
prosecution to prove lack of prejudice.
269. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003);
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 374.
270. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 377.
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present a mitigation case, than counsel's decisions as to how to proceed.27'
Finally, this decision is important because it indicates that the Court is
willing to hold counsel ineffective even in cases where counsel's
performance was neither nonexistent nor terrible.272
From 1976 to 2002 the Supreme Court denied review in most death
penalty cases.273 In 1984, the Court established the standard for determining
effective assistance of counsel in Strickland, yet it was not until 2000 that
the Court overturned a death sentence for ineffective assistance under
Strickland.2 74 This represents the Court's longstanding reluctance to deem
capital defense counsels' performance deficient. Indeed, critics argue that
Strickland is not demanding enough; courts seek to attribute conduct to
strategy, and when that is impossible, they attempt to conclude that the
conduct did not prejudice the defense.2 75 As a result, despite cases involving
questionable representation, lawyers are given the benefit of the doubt, and
271. If one reads the American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance
of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases in conjunction with the opinion in Rompilla, it is
obvious that the Court relied heavily on these standards in making its decision that counsel's
performance was deficient. Indeed, the opinion even quotes verbatim from the standards in its
opinion, when it concludes that counsel breached its duty to investigate prior convictions that can be
used as aggravating circumstances by the prosecution. Id. at 387. Yet, in the past, the language in
Strickland, which stated that judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential,
allowed courts to turn a blind eye to these standards and conclude that counsel's errors were the
result of a tactical decision. Levinson, supra note 5, at 165. Here, the Court refuses to take the easy
way out, and closely scrutinizes counsel's conduct in light of prevailing professional norms of
defense lawyering in capital cases.
272. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 380-81. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 53. This is perhaps the most
significant aspect of the Court's decision, as the Court is taking a stance in refusing to accept
mediocre defense lawyering. In the past, courts have labeled to be "effective" representation
instances in which attorneys were intoxicated, abusing drugs, mentally ill, or sleeping during the
trial. Kirchmeier, supra note 7, at 455. Here, defense counsel were competent and fully alert
throughout the entire proceeding, and they conducted an investigation for mitigation evidence,
despite suffering from a lack of time and resources. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 380-81. For all intents
and purposes, they provided decent representation, which was clearly much better than what many
capital defendants receive. However, the Court was not content with settling for passable
representation, but rather insisted on high quality representation. It is no coincidence that this is the
level of representation required by the current American Bar Association standards. DEATH
PENALTY GUIDELINES, supra note 90, at § 1.1.
273. Chemerinsky, supra note 118, at 208.
274. Green, supra note 29, at 670.
275. Levinson, supra note 5, at 165. First, it is argued that Strickland allows courts to ignore
egregious conduct if an attorney's error can somehow be attributed to a tactical choice. Id. Second,
critics allege that Strickland does not provide a workable framework by which to measure attorney
performance, which has in turn given reviewing courts broad discretion in determining what
constitutes effective assistance, leading to inconsistent judgments. Murphy, supra note 85, at 179.
Third, critics argue that the prejudice requirement presents a near insurmountable hurdle for
defendants, and questionable representation by attorneys is often not evaluated if their conduct did
not prejudice the outcome of the case. Gable & Green, supra note 63, at 764.
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few convictions have been reversed. A large part of the Court's reluctance
to create a stricter standard for attorney conduct is the concern that courts
would then be flooded with ineffective assistance claims, as it would be
easier for defendants to prevail. 27 6  Thus, the Court has viewed the
deprivation of fair procedures for some defendants as a necessary evil due to
the concern for judicial economy, which has taken precedence over the issue
of poor lawyering. This is the view retained by the dissenters in Rompilla,
who are hesitant to veer from precedent.7v
It is remarkable that for a period of sixteen years, no death sentences
were overturned by the Court for ineffective assistance, yet in the span of
five years three death sentences have been invalidated under Strickland.278
This represents the Court's growing concern over the quality of lawyering in
capital cases, and its efforts to impose stricter standards on the lawyer's
performance. Although the Court has not explicitly required counsel to
comport with the American Bar Association standards, it has incorporated
these standards in its decisions in both Wiggins and Rompilla.279 Thus, each
holding has established a specific guideline that counsel must abide by in
order for his or her performance to be deemed adequate. As a result, these
276. See Murphy, supra note 85, at 191 (observing that "[alpparently, the Court decided that
controlling the deluge of appeals by convicted defendants was preferable to holding attorneys
accountable for anything but the most blatant sort of negligent practice").
277. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 399-400 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissenters are adamant about
adhering to the language of Strickland, which required that courts be highly deferential to counsel's
decisions. Id. They reiterate the fact that Strickland specifically stated that American Bar
Association standards and the like should only be used as guides and not a constitutional framework
for analyzing counsel's performance. Id. Further, the dissenters voice their concern that the
decision has departed from precedent in stating that "[t]he majority's analysis contains barely a
mention of Strickland and makes little effort to square today's holding with our traditional reluctance
to impose rigid requirements on defense counsel." Id. Similarly, in the dissenting opinion in
Wiggins, Justices Scalia and Thomas, who also joined the dissent in Rompilla, insisted that under
Strickland the American Bar Association standards are only to be used as guides. Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 543 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
However, the majority seems to be of the opinion that the Strickland standard is inadequate, at
least as applied to the sentencing phase in capital trials, thus making a departure from precedent a
necessity. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387.
278. See Green, supra note 29, at 670.
279. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 374; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 510. In 2003, The American Bar
Association propounded the Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, which are designed to "set forth a national standard of practice for the defense
of capital cases in order to ensure high quality legal representation for all persons facing the possible
imposition or execution of a death sentence by any jurisdiction." DEATH PENALTY GUIDELINES,
supra note 90, at § 1.1 (A). The Guidelines are said to "embody the current consensus about what is
required to provide effective defense representation in capital cases." Id. at §1.1, cmt. The
Guidelines state that attorneys should limit their workloads, inform their clients of all issues that
might materially impact their case, and conduct thorough investigations relating to issues of guilt
and penalty, so as to enable them to provide each client with high quality representation. Id. at §§
10.3, 10.5, 10.7. In particular, counsel must "investigate prior convictions ... that could be used as
aggravating circumstances" and "should use all appropriate avenues . . . to obtain all potentially
relevant information pertaining to the client, his or her siblings and parents, and other family
members." Id. at § 10.7 cmt.
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holdings have raised the bar for attorney conduct, suggesting that courts
should give less deference to counsel's decisions and closely scrutinize their
acts or omissions before making a determination as to the quality of
their performance. 
2 80
The decision in Rompilla is important because the Court deemed
counsel ineffective even though counsel's conduct was neither nonexistent
nor appalling.18' This represents an important shift in ineffective assistance
jurisprudence, as courts have consistently deemed representation much
worse than this to be adequate. Although the ruling in Rompilla was
narrowly confined to its particular facts and circumstances, its holding
suggests that courts should look more closely and critically at counsel's
conduct, and give much weight to the American Bar Association standards
in measuring attorney performance.282 Its net effect is that courts may turn
to the Rompilla decision and decide to take a stronger stance against poor
280. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 398-99; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537-38; Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 377.
In Williams, the Court held that counsel has a duty to conduct a thorough investigation of the
defendant's background. Williams, 529 U.S. at 396. The majority specifically cites the American
Bar Association standards as the source for this requirement. Id. Similarly, in Wiggins, the Court
turns to its decision in Williams in determining how to conduct its analysis. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at
522. The Court then turns to the American Bar Association standards, which state that counsel
should attempt "to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any
aggravating" circumstances the prosecution may introduce at trial. Id. at 524. When measured
against these standards, the Court concluded that counsel abandoned their investigation too soon,
such that they could not possibly have made a fully informed tactical decision with respect to
strategy. Id. at 527. In Rompilla, the Court concluded that in light of prevailing professional norms,
counsel's failure to investigate Rompilla's prior conviction file constituted deficient performance.
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383.
281. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381-82; see Garrett, supra note 14, at 53.
282. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 385-87. The majority states that
[n]o reasonable lawyer would forego examination of the file thinking he could do as well
by asking the defendant or family relations whether they recalled anything helpful or
damaging in the prior victim's testimony. Nor would a reasonable lawyer compare
possible searches for school reports, juvenile records, and evidence of drinking habits to
the opportunity to take a look at a file disclosing what the prosecutor knows and even
plans to read from in his case.
Id. at 389. If we analyzed counsel's decisions by strictly applying Strickland, the Court should have
avoided using hindsight and examined counsel's decisions based on his perspective at the time.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Here, counsel knew the prosecution intended to
introduce testimony of Rompilla's victim in his prior crime to establish the aggravator of a prior
conviction, but they did not believe that they could have rebutted this through further investigation
of the file, so they decided not to examine it. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 385-86. Rather, counsel decided
to focus on building a mitigation case by interviewing Rompilla and some of his family members, in
addition to having three mental health experts look into his mental state. Id. at 381-82. Based on
counsel's perspective at the time, these decisions seem reasonablc. However, here the Court
departed from the Strickland approach, and based their decision on the fact that counsel's
performance, while decent, was nevertheless inadequate because it failed to measure up to the
prevailing professional norms. Id. at 389-90.
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lawyering. For example, a situation may arise in which an attorney makes
mitigation efforts, but nevertheless falls far below the standard of reasonable
competency according to prevailing professional norms because he or she
failed to pursue a particular line of investigation. Following the reasoning in
Rompilla, a court may then deem counsel's performance deficient, which
will serve to further define "effective assistance." If courts begin to hold
attorneys to a higher standard, the quality of representation should
ameliorate, as attorneys will know what is expected of them and will no
longer commit the same errors without consequence.283
In the past, the prejudice prong under Strickland has posed the biggest
stumbling block for defendants raising ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, because even if a defendant can prove that counsel's performance
was deficient, their claim will be dismissed if there is no prejudice. 284 As
one commentator noted, "[b]ecause Strickland is a two-prong test, and
defendants must make sufficient showings under both prongs, altering one
prong without altering the other will have little effect on the ultimate
outcome of cases.,, 285 The Court altered the performance prong in Williams
by requiring counsel to conduct a thorough investigation of a defendant's
background.286 The performance prong was further relaxed in Wiggins,
where the Court held that strategic choices made before conducting a
complete investigation must be reasonable in terms of prevailing
professional norms.287 Now, Rompilla additionally weakens the
performance prong by requiring counsel to examine a defendant's prior
conviction file if they know that the prosecution intends to use the prior
crime as an aggravating circumstance. 288  These cases, when considered
together, impose stricter standards on attorney conduct, and effectively make
it easier for a defendant to prove deficient performance. At first glance,
none of these decisions appear to do anything to modify or weaken the
prejudice prong, making the alterations to the first prong useless. However,
the Court found prejudice in all three cases, which involved situations in
which counsel failed to uncover and present significant mitigation
evidence. 289 All three defendants suffered physical abuse and neglect during
283. Levinson, supra note 5, at 178. One commentator argues that higher standards for
ineffective assistance could ultimately lead to the elimination of the death penalty because "almost
all capital defendants have mitigating circumstances, and requiring attorneys to be skilled enough to
bring them out will neutralize the aggravating factors brought out by the prosecution and result in
significantly fewer impositions of the death penalty." Id.
284. Gable & Green, supra note 63, at 764.
285. Green, supra note 29, at 673.
286. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391-98 (2000).
287. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-23 (2003).
288. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390-91 (2005).
289. Williams, 529 U.S. 362 at 398 (finding prejudice because "the graphic description of
Williams' childhood, filled with abuse and privation, or the reality that he was 'borderline mentally
retarded', might well have influenced the jury's appraisal of his moral culpability"); Wiggins, 539
U.S. at 535 (holding that had the jury been confronted with the fact that Wiggins "experienced
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their youth and suffer from diminished mental capacities. 290  The Court
acknowledges that this is the kind of evidence it has "declared relevant to
assessing a defendant's moral culpability."' 29' In each of these cases the
Court focuses primarily on the performance prong, and quickly concludes
that the prejudice prong is satisfied. It appears that the Court already made
up its mind that counsel's assistance was constitutionally infirm before even
292
considering the prejudice prong. These cases suggest that perhaps the
Court relaxed the defendant's burden of proving prejudice in cases where an
overwhelming amount of evidence as to the defendant's background and
mental state was not presented to the jury. Based on the Court's consistent
findings of prejudice in these cases, it almost appears as if the Court has
implicitly expanded the number of exceptions in which prejudice is
presumed to include cases such as these.
With the addition of Rompilla, the Supreme Court is sending out a clear
signal that it is concerned with the quality of lawyering in capital cases and
whether the death penalty can be administered fairly. This is not one
isolated example, but rather it involves the invalidation of three death
sentences in quick succession, thus requiring the lower courts to take notice
of the Supreme Court's call to improve the Strickland standard.
B. Societal Impact
The ruling in Rompilla generates an important societal impact, as it
seeks to improve the quality of representation for capital defendants and
indicates that the Court may be veering away from the death penalty. The
Court's actions may, in fact, be in response to the recent decline in public
support for the death penalty.293 According to a new landmark study on the
error rates in capital cases, "[t]here is a growing bipartisan consensus that
severe privation and abuse ... while in the custody of his alcoholic absentee mother ... [and that]
[hie suffered physical torment, sexual molestation, and repeated rape during his subsequent years in
foster care ... along with his diminished mental capacities" there is a reasonable probability that it
would have returned a different sentence); Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393 (holding that had counsel
presented the jury with information pertaining to Rompilla's traumatic childhood, mental health, and
alcoholism, "the likelihood of a different result ...is 'sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome' actually reached at sentencing").
290. Williams, 529 U.S. at 397; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535; Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393.
291. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535.
292. Critics of Strickland urge that proving deficient performance alone should be sufficient to
find a constitutional violation. See Gable & Green, supra note 63, at 765-69; Gabriel, supra note 85,
at 1276. The idea is that counsel's deficient performance deprives a defendant of procedural
fairness, which is what the Sixth Amendment guarantees.
293. Liebman, supra note 1, at 2. According to the study, six years ago four-fifths of the
population were in favor of the death penalty, whereas currently only two-thirds of the population
support the death penalty. Id. at i.
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flaws in America's death-penalty system have reached crisis proportions" as
the capital appeals process is often very lengthy, and capital trials put many
people on death row that do not deserve to be there.194  Further, the study
indicates that of the capital judgments that were fully reviewed between the
years of 1973 and 1995, sixty-eight percent were overturned due to serious
error, with one of the most common errors being grossly incompetent
defense lawyering.295
Among the main concerns with the administration of the death penalty
in the United States are that innocent people are getting sentenced to death
and executed, and that many facing death sentences are not provided with
adequate counsel.296 Until recently, the Supreme Court seemed to take a
relatively passive role in death penalty cases, particularly in cases involving
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in capital cases. 297 However, in the
past five years, the Supreme Court has ruled that the execution of juveniles
and the mentally retarded is unconstitutional and, in addition has overturned
three death sentences for ineffective assistance of counsel.298
While the Supreme Court has taken a more active role in death penalty
cases in the past five years, there is a concern that this trend might change,
due to the recent change in composition of the Court with the appointment
of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Connor. It has been said that the replacement of Chief Justice
Rehnquist with Chief Justice Roberts will "not affect the Court's balance"
294. Id. at 2. The study indicated that "82% of the people whose capital judgments were
overturned by state post-conviction courts due to serious error were found to deserve a sentence less
than death ... [and] 7% were found to be innocent of the capital crime." Id. at ii.
295. Id. at i.
296. See id.
297. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (attorney's failure to advise defendant on parole
eligibility did not constitute prejudice under Strickland); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987)
(counsel's decision not to conduct a complete investigation into defendant's background for
mitigating evidence was reasonable and did not constitute ineffective assistance); Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (counsel's failure to raise an objection that an aggravating factor in
his sentence improperly duplicated an element of the offense for which he was convicted did not
constitute prejudice); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (defense counsel's failure to make a closing
argument does not warrant a presumption of ineffectiveness); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1
(2003) (defense counsel's failure to discuss certain piece of exculpatory information in his closing
argument did not constitute ineffective assistance); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (since the
defendant neither consented nor objected to counsel's strategy to concede guilt during his capital
trial, the concession did not automatically constitute ineffective assistance).
298. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that execution of juveniles constitutes a
violation of the Eighth Amendment as juveniles are less culpable than the average criminal); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of the mentally retarded constitutes
excessive punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000) (overturning a death sentence due to counsel's failure to uncover and present significant
mitigating evidence); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (invalidating a death sentence due to
counsel's failure to further expand their investigation to discover and present additional mitigating
evidence); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (overturning a death sentence due to counsel's
failure to examine the defendant's prior conviction file when it knew the prosecution planned to use
the prior to prove an aggravating circumstance).
1182
[Vol. 34: 1139, 2007] Raising the Bar
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
because "[1]ike Rehnquist, Roberts is deeply conservative. '299 Of concern is
the replacement of Justice O'Connor, who has often provided the swing vote
in death penalty cases, most recently in Rompilla.300 Although Justice
O'Connor has long been a supporter of the death penalty, she recently
revealed that her thoughts on attorney performance standards are changing
due in part to her awareness of "[s]erious questions . . . being raised about
whether the death penalty is being fairly administered" and her concern that
"'the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be
executed."' 3 °  She then proposed that "'it's time to look at minimum
standards for appointed counsel in death cases and adequate compensation
for appointed counsel when they are used."' 302 Given these statements, it is
not surprising that she joined the majority in Williams, Wiggins, and
Rompilla, to overturn death sentences due to ineffective assistance of
counsel during sentencing.30 3 Since Justice O'Connor has frequently been a
swing vote in death penalty cases, her replacement will play a very
important role in future decisions.
During his tenure as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, Justice Alito heard ten capital cases. 4  In five of these cases, he
disagreed with his colleagues and voted to uphold a death sentence against
the inmate.30 5 Of particular importance is the fact that Justice Alito presided
over Rompilla's case when it came before the Third Circuit to determine
whether the Federal District Court should have granted his habeas petition as
299. MSNBC, Roberts Confirmation Hearings to Begin Monday (Sept. 6, 2005), http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/9215790/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). With the exception of Wiggins, in which
Rehnquist voted with the majority to invalidate the death sentence due to ineffective assistance of
counsel, he typically votes in favor of the death penalty. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 510. But see
Williams, 529 U.S. at 416 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (voting to uphold Williams' death sentence);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the
imposition of the death penalty of the mentally retarded is constitutional); Roper, 543 U.S. at 587
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (joining in the dissenting opinion, which held that execution of juveniles
should not be categorically unconstitutional); Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(joining in the dissenting opinion, which held that Rompilla's death sentence should be upheld).
300. Editorial, Justice O'Connor on Executions, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, available at
http://www.nhcadp.org/justice-sandra-day-oconnor.htm. Indeed, Justice O'Connor provided the
swing vote in Rompilla, in which she joined the majority in overturning Rompilla's death sentence.
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393.
301. Editorial, Justice O'Connor on Executions, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, available at http://
www.nhcadp.org/justice-sandraday-oconnor.htm.
302. Id.
303. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 362; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 510; Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 374.
304. Goodwin Liu & Lynsay Skiba, Judge Alito and the Death Penalty 1 (Am. Const. Soc'y for L.
& Policy, Paper, 2005), available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/555.
305. Id.
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to his ineffective assistance claim.30 6 Justice Alito authored the 2-1 panel
decision, reversing the grant of his petition, holding that counsel's
performance was reasonable.30 7 He stated that "while a 'good' or 'prudent'
lawyer might have examined the records, Rompilla's lawyers had done all
that was 'constitutionally compelled' by interviewing him, some of his
family members, and three mental health professionals." In arriving at this
conclusion, "Judge Alito rejected the relevance of the American Bar
Association (ABA) Standards for Criminal Justice to determining the scope
of defense counsel's duty to investigate. 3 8
Rompilla's case then came before the Supreme Court to resolve the
issue as to whether counsel's performance required the sentence to be
overturned. The Supreme Court reversed in a five to four decision, with
Justice O'Connor casting the swing vote. The Court found that Judge
Alito's decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established
law.30 9 This is particularly important given the fact that Justice O'Connor's
vote decided this case, and had Justice Alito been on the Supreme Court in
her place he would have voted to uphold Rompilla's death sentence. Justice
Alito's reasoning is in line with the dissenters, who felt that counsel's
performance was adequate. This carries significant implications as Justice
Alito's presence on the Supreme Court threatens to arrest the Court's recent
steps to modify Strickland and raise the bar for defense lawyering in capital
cases. Justice Alito's propensity to rule against the inmate and uphold death
sentences led one commentator to conclude that "his opinions . . . show a
disturbing tendency to tolerate serious errors in capital proceedings., 310 If
this is true, then Rompilla may mark the end of the Court's progression
toward stricter standards for capital defense attorneys.
On the whole, it is difficult to determine the effect that Rompilla will
have on society given its narrow application. Although it represents yet
another step forward in the Court's efforts to impose stricter standards on
capital defense attorneys, the fact that it was decided on the narrowest means
possible is a sign of the Court's lingering reluctance to depart from
precedent, which may be propounded with the addition of Justice Alito to
the Court. However, when combined with the Court's recent rulings in
Williams and Wiggins, and the decline in public support for the death
penalty, there may be fewer death sentences imposed as attorneys are now
306. Id. at 8 (citing Rompilla v. Hom, 355 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2004)).
307. Id. at 9.
308. Id. This aligns him with the dissenters, who refuse to depart from Strickland, holding fast to
the notion that the American Bar Association standards are only to be used at guides and should not
be viewed as codifications of the Sixth Amendment requirements. Yet if these guidelines represent
the consensus as to what constitutes high quality legal representation, it seems that they should be
given more weight.
309. Id. (citing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005)).
310. Id. at 1.
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held to a higher standard, and judges have more guidance as to what
constitutes effective assistance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent decisions regarding capital defendants' claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the Court has shown a tendency toward modifying
Strickland and imposing stricter standards on capital defense lawyers, and
Rompilla is no exception. On its own, Rompilla does not appear to have a
wide-reaching effect. However, when analyzed in light of the Court's recent
decisions and its sudden shift in attitude toward imposition of the death
penalty, it bears much significance. With each new decision, the Court has
further defined "effective assistance", establishing rules of conduct for
attorneys and providing lower courts with more guidance as to how to
evaluate attorney performance. Although the Court originally held in
Strickland that no specific guidelines for attorney performance should be
implemented, its recent decisions have done just the opposite. Given the
current publicity over wrongful convictions due in large part to ineffective
lawyering,"' the Court has recognized the need to re-work Strickland.
Although the Court has stopped short of making substantial changes to
Strickland, it has taken several steps in quick succession to lessen the burden
defendants must overcome in order to prove ineffective assistance. Had the
composition of the Court remained as it was, one could predict that the
Court would continue to re-work Strickland in future ineffective assistance
of counsel claims. However, with the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito, the question remains as to whether the Court will continue on
its quest to improve procedural fairness in capital trials, or whether it will
stop in its tracks and revert to its passive approach to death penalty cases.
Only time will tell.
Whitney Cawley"2
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